The Strange Nature of Quantum Perception: To See a Photon, One Must Be a Photon by Rosen, Steven M.
	 The	Strange	Nature	of	Quantum	Perception:		To	See	a	Photon,	One	Must	Be	a	Photon1		 Steven	M.	Rosen		ABSTRACT	This	paper	takes	as	its	point	of	departure	recent	research	into	the	possibility	that	human	beings	can	perceive	single	photons.	In	order	to	appreciate	what	quantum	perception	may	entail,	we	first	explore	several	of	the	leading	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics,	then	consider	an	alternative	view	based	on	the	ontological	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	and	Martin	Heidegger.	Next,	the	philosophical	analysis	is	brought	into	sharper	focus	by	employing	a	perceptual	model,	the	Necker	cube,	augmented	by	the	topology	of	the	Klein	bottle.	This	paves	the	way	for	addressing	in	greater	depth	the	paper’s	central	question:	Just	what	would	it	take	to	observe	the	quantum	reality	of	the	photon?	In	formulating	an	answer,	we	examine	the	nature	of	scientific	objectivity	itself,	along	with	the	paradoxical	properties	of	light.	The	conclusion	reached	is	that	quantum	perception	requires	a	new	kind	of	observation,	one	in	which	the	observer	of	the	photon	adopts	a	concretely	self-reflexive	observational	posture	that	brings	her	into	close	ontological	relationship	with	the	observed.		KEYWORDS:	quantum	perception;	photon;	quantum	mechanics;	subject	and	object;	phenomenological	philosophy;	Necker	cube;	topology;	light;	proprioception		1.	INTRODUCTION	TO	QUANTUM	PERCEPTION		 	For	many	decades	it	has	been	suspected	that	the	human	visual	system	is	sensitive	enough	to	be	able	to	detect	single	particles	of	light.	Only	recently	has	this	hypothesis	been	confirmed.	Using	a	quantum	light	source	capable	of	generating	individual	photons,	Tinsley	and	his	associates	(2016)	demonstrated	that	human	beings	can	indeed	detect	solitary	photons.	The	finding	has	gained	additional	support	in	the	laboratory	of	Paul	Kwiat	and	Rebecca	Holmes	(Holmes	et	al.	2018).	It	is	noteworthy	that	researchers	pursuing	this	line	of	investigation	have	not	limited	themselves	to	verifying	the	detectability	of	single	photons	but	have	set	their	sights	on	determining	whether	human	vision	can	be	pushed	even	further	in	the	attempt	“to	probe	the	very	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics”	(Ananthaswamy	2018).	The	standard	approach	to	quantum	mechanics	is	the	Copenhagen	interpretation.	This	outlook	lends	itself	to	the	view	that	there	is	in	fact	no	way	of	knowing	the	underlying	reality	giving	rise	to	observed	photons.	The	Copenhagen																																																									1	This	article	was	inspired	by	a	private	communication	from	Beth	Macy	informing	me	of	recent	breakthroughs	in	single-photon	vision	research.	I	also	gratefully	acknowledge	that	the	paper’s	subtitle	was	suggested	by	Marlene	Schiwy	in	the	course	of	informal	discussions	about	the	issues	involved.	
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interpretation	does	posit	a	probabilistic	quantum	wave	in	which	particle	states	are	superposed,	rather	than	the	particle	being	definitively	given	in	one	state	as	opposed	to	another.	When	the	particle	is	observed,	the	wave	“collapses”;	it	is	reduced	so	that	the	particle	now	appears	in	just	a	single	state.	Yet	according	to	the	Copenhagen	approach,	the	quantum	probability	wave	has	no	physical	reality	per	se	but	is	only	a	mathematical	function.	On	this	view,	the	wave	does	not	exist	in	a	concrete	sense	but	is	merely	the	form	taken	by	the	abstract	equation	used	to	generate	practical	predictions	about	the	behavior	of	particles.	The	proposed	experiments	to	be	conducted	at	the	lower	threshold	of	sensitivity	to	light	would	challenge	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	by	exploring	the	possibility	of	actually	observing	the	quantum	wave.	Thus,	in	speaking	of	the	prospect	of	going	beyond	the	detection	of	single	photons	to	test	“the	perception	of	superposition	states,”	Holmes	et	al.	(2018)	are	indicating	that	we	may	be	able	to	detect	the	photon	wave	while	its	quantum	states	are	still	superposed,	before	the	wave	collapses	to	give	mutually	exclusive	states.	But	there	is	a	significant	obstacle	to	this	research,	for	it	is	by	no	means	certain	that	a	photon	transmitted	to	the	eye	of	an	observer	will	actually	register	in	the	retina	and	be	sent	on	to	the	brain	for	perception.	Describing	the	work	of	physicist	Alipasha	Vaziri,	Castelvecchi	(2016)	notes	that	“more	than	90%	of	photons	that	enter	the	front	of	the	eye	never	even	reach	a	rod	cell,	because	they	are	absorbed	or	reflected	by	other	parts	of	the	eye.”	Other	experiments	with	single-photon	detection	encounter	the	same	kind	of	problem.	Holmes	sums	up	the	ephemeral	nature	of	these	studies:	“The	primary	challenge	for…single-photon	vision	experiments	will	be	the	low	probability	that	a	photon	is	transmitted	to	the	photoreceptors	and	detected	in	any	given	experimental	trial	(perhaps	5–10%,	assuming	a	perfectly	efficient	source),	and	the	corresponding	requirement	for	a	very	large	number	of	experimental	trials”	to	determine	whether	the	statistics	bear	out	that	single	photons	are	actually	being	detected,	however	small	the	effect	(Holmes	et	al.	2018).		 In	experiments	such	as	these,	certain	tacit	assumptions	are	made	in	accordance	with	long-held	habits	of	observation.	Whether	hoping	to	observe	a	photon	in	a	single	state	or	as	the	superposed	photon	states	of	the	quantum	wave,	the	observer	viewing	the	particle	display	is	poised	to	encounter	an	object	appearing	in	the	space	stretched	out	before	him	or	her.	The	observer’s	implicit	posture	is	thus	externally	oriented,	set	to	take	in	what	lies	“out	there,”	with	the	observer	him-	or	herself	set	apart	from	what	is	observed.	This	is	how	we	normally	take	things	in.	We	have	been	doing	this	for	hundreds	of	years,	both	in	everyday	observation,	and,	especially,	in	empirical	science.	What	I	venture	to	suggest	in	this	article	is	that,	while	we	may	indeed	be	able	to	observe	the	quantum	substrate	underlying	the	photon,	we	can	only	do	so	effectively	by	changing	the	default	setting	long	relied	upon	for	our	manner	of	observation.	Before	we	can	fully	appreciate	what	quantum	perception	might	entail,	it	will	be	necessary	to	examine	the	quantum	world	in	greater	depth.	In	Sect.	2,	I	explore	various	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics	and	their	philosophical	implications.	Then,	with	this	conceptual	spadework	behind	us,	I	offer	a	specific	model	of	quantum	
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perception	that	eventually	leads	us	back	to	our	ultimate	question	of	just	what	is	required	for	the	observation	of	quantum	reality.		2.	EXPLORING	THE	QUANTUM	DIMENSION		In	a	1964	lecture,	physicist	Richard	Feynman	famously	declared:	“I	think	I	can	safely	say	that	nobody	understands	quantum	mechanics”	(1967,	129).	This	appraisal	seems	to	have	held	up	fairly	well	in	the	intervening	years.	I	noted	above	that	the	minimalist	Copenhagen	interpretation	is	the	standard	approach	to	quantum	mechanics.	From	its	inception	almost	a	century	ago,	the	Copenhagen	school	apparently	has	been	content	to	leave	open	the	question	of	what	quantum	phenomena	actually	mean.	Here	the	equations	are	not	expected	to	provide	insight	into	the	physical	structure	of	quantum	reality	but	only	to	effectively	predict	particle	behavior.	As	physicist	David	Mermin	put	it,	“If	I	were	forced	to	sum	up	in	one	sentence	what	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	says	to	me,	it	would	be	‘Shut	up	and	calculate!’”	(1989,	9).	It	is	not	that	alternatives	to	Copenhagen	have	not	been	offered.	The	proposals	include	a	range	of	mind-independent	(realist)	views	of	the	quantum	domain,	such	as	Everett’s	“many	worlds”	interpretation	(1973),	Bohm’s	pilot	wave	theory	(1952),	and	the	more	recent	Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber	(GRW)	observer-independent	model	of	wave	collapse	(1986).	There	are	also	mind-dependent	(immaterialist	or	idealist)	approaches	such	as	those	of	von	Neumann-Wigner	(von	Neumann	1932,	Wigner	1961),	Wheeler	(1990),	and	Goswami	(1995).	Nevertheless,	after	many	decades,	“the	Copenhagen	interpretation	still	reigns	supreme”	(Schlosshauer	et	al.	2013).	What	this	is	telling	us,	in	effect,	is	that	the	quantum	domain	remains	a	black	box	to	most	theoretical	physicists.		It	is	telling	us	what	Feynman	told	us	50	years	earlier:	that	a	widely	accepted	understanding	of	quantum	reality	has	not	yet	been	achieved.		
2.1.	Mind-Independent	and	Mind-Dependent	Interpretations	of	Quantum	Mechanics			 Let	us	take	a	deeper	look	at	the	Copenhagen	interpretation.	Is	it	actually	as	non-committal	as	it	claims	to	be	with	regard	to	the	nature	of	quantum	reality?	At	the	level	of	its	explicit	content,	the	answer	is	yes:	Advocates	of	Copenhagen	maintain	their	silence	on	the	quantum	phenomenon	per	se,	treating	it	as	a	black	box.	However,	when	we	consider	the	form	taken	by	Copenhagen	mathematics,	we	see	that	it	implicitly	enforces	the	same	paradigm	that	underlies	mind-independent,	objective	realist	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics.	The	realist	paradigm	is	intuitively	compelling	in	that	it	accords	with	our	everyday	experience	of	the	world.	What	is	real	is	seen	to	lie	objectively	“out	there”	in	space,	existing	independently	of	the	subject	who	perceives	it.	For	the	scientist	employing	this	paradigm	of	“object-in-space-before-subject”	(Rosen	2004,	2008a,	2015),	space	must	be	continuous,	for	it	is	only	in	a	continuum	that	precise	observations	and	measurements	can	be	made	of	the	objects	and	events	appearing	before	the	observing	subject.	The	inherent	discontinuity	we	find	in	quantum	phenomena	calls	objective	measurement	into	question,	since	it	implies	that,	in	
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microspace,	in	fact	we	cannot	determine	unequivocally	the	position	of	a	system.	How	does	quantum	mechanics	respond	to	this	challenge?	A	central	feature	of	the	quantum	theoretic	formalism	employed	by	the	Copenhagen	School	is	analysis	by	probability.	When	quantum	mechanics	was	confronted	with	the	inability	to	precisely	determine	a	particle’s	location	in	space,	it	did	not	merely	resign	itself	to	the	lack	of	continuity	that	creates	this	fundamental	uncertainty.	Instead	of	allowing	the	conclusion	that	a	microsystem	in	principle	cannot	occupy	a	completely	distinct	position—which	would	be	tantamount	to	admitting	that	microspace	is	not	completely	continuous—a	multiplicity	of	continuous	spaces	was	axiomatically	invoked	to	account	for	the	“probable”	positions	of	the	particle:	“it”	is	locally	“here”	with	a	certain	probability,	or	“there”	with	another.	This	collection	of	spaces	is	known	as	Hilbert	space.	Just	how	effectively	does	Hilbert	space	preserve	continuity	and	the	underlying	objectivism	with	which	it	is	coupled?	Each	subspace	of	the	multi-space	expression	is	made	continuous	within	itself	to	uphold	the	mutual	exclusiveness	of	the	alternative	positions	of	the	observed	particle.	Such	subspaces	must	be	disjoint	with	respect	to	each	other,	their	unity	being	imposed	externally,	by	fiat,	rather	than	being	of	an	internal,	intuitively	compelling	order.	So,	in	the	name	of	maintaining	mathematical	continuity,	a	rather	extravagantly	discontinuous	state	of	affairs	is	actually	permitted	in	the	standard	formalism	for	quantum	mechanics,	an	indefinitely	large	aggregate	of	essentially	discrete,	disunited	spaces.	This	Hilbert	space	approach	is	reminiscent	of	an	earlier	stratagem	for	resisting	change.	Bohm	(1980)	describes	the	universally	sanctioned	response	given	at	a	time	in	history	when	a	hitherto	dominant	order	of	thinking	and	perceiving	became	suspect.	The	order	of	ancient	Greece	was	predicated	on	the	idea	of	the	circle,	expressed	specifically	in	the	conviction	that	celestial	bodies	trace	perfectly	circular	orbits.	“To	be	sure,”	noted	Bohm,		when	more	detailed	observations	were	made	on	the	planets,	it	was	found	that	their	orbits	are	not	actually	perfect	circles,	but	this	fact	was	accommodated	within	the	prevailing	notions	of	order	by	considering	the	orbits	of	planets	as	a	super-position	of	epicycles,	i.e.,	circles	within	circles.	Thus	one	sees	an	example	of	the	remarkable	capacity	for	adaptation	within	a	given	notion	of	order,	adaptation	that	enables	one	to	go	on	perceiving	and	talking	in	terms	of	essentially	fixed	notions	of	this	kind	in	spite	of	factual	evidence	that	might	at	first	sight	seem	to	necessitate	a	thorough-going	change	in	such	notions.	(1980,	112)		I	might	add	that,	in	the	Ptolemaic	notion	of	“epicycles,”	there	was	a	kind	of	mockery	of	the	image	of	the	circle,	an	extravagantly	complex,	wholly	gratuitous	replication	of	this	image,	one	that	did	not	truly	achieve	what	it	sought,	given	the	fact	that	the	circle	actually	had	lost	its	original	meaning	and	effectuality.	Yet	those	who	were	determined	to	uphold	circularity	blinded	themselves	to	this.	Do	not	the	self-continuous	subspaces	of	the	Hilbert	formalism	mock	continuity	in	largely	the	same	way	the	self-circular	epicycles	of	antiquity	mocked	circularity?	Perhaps	we	could	say	that	the	challenge	posed	by	questioning	continuity	
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is	even	greater	than	that	posed	by	questioning	circularity.	What	is	being	called	into	question	by	quantum	phenomena	is	not	merely	a	particular	object	(like	the	image	of	the	circle)	that	the	subject	can	reflect	upon,	but	the	reflective	posture	itself,	the	whole	relation	of	object-in-space-before-subject.	And	the	response	to	this	profound	questioning	has	been	decidedly	Ptolemaic.	In	the	method	that	has	been	adopted	by	Copenhagen	physicists,	rather	than	offering	a	novel	approach	that	would	be	genuinely	amenable	to	the	discontinuous,	non-objectifiable	phenomena	of	the	microworld,	the	attempt	is	made	to	pour	the	“new	wine”	into	an	“old	bottle.”	The	standard	stratagem	is	to	express	the	upsurgent	discontinuity	in	such	a	way	that	continuity	is	implicitly	preserved.	Yet	it	is	evident	that	continuity	actually	is	not	successfully	maintained	in	quantum	mechanics.	Despite	the	artificial	semblance	of	it,	on	the	subtler	level	of	the	form	that	quantum	theory	takes,	continuity	is	denied	(Rosen	1994,	2004,	2008a). As	a	matter	of	fact,	if	we	were	to	follow	the	full	development	of	quantum	mechanics,	we	would	see	that,	in	the	end,	even	the	semblance	of	continuity	is	lost	in	the	failed	attempt	to	arrive	at	an	effective	account	of	quantum	gravity.	For,	at	the	submicroscopic	scale	where	the	challenge	of	unifying	the	quantum	forces	with	gravitation	is	played	out	(at	the	Planck	length	of	10-35	meter),	infinite	probability	values	turn	up	that	render	the	equations	useless.	I’ve	gone	into	this	in	great	detail	elsewhere	(e.g.,	Rosen	2008a,	2008b,	2015,	2017)	and	will	not	expound	further	on	it	here.	Suffice	it	to	say	that,	in	following	the	Copenhagen-inspired	exhortation	to	“shut	up	and	calculate,”	we	are	being	less	reticent	than	we	think.	If	the	implicit	objectivism	of	Copenhagen’s	mathematical	program	undermines	the	ability	to	adequately	account	for	phenomena	that	do	not	conform	to	the	expectations	of	objective	realism,	openly	realist	approaches	to	quantum	mechanics	certainly	fare	no	better.	Explicit	forms	of	realism	(Everett’s	“many	worlds”	interpretation,	Bohm’s	pilot	wave	theory,	etc.),	in	adhering	to	the	paradigm	of	object-in-space-before-subject,	thus	can	shed	little	light	on	the	meaning	of	quantum	reality.	Before	proceeding	to	consider	the	mind-dependent	approach	to	quantum	mechanics,	I	want	to	emphasize	that	the	microphysical	challenge	to	classical	continuity	is	at	once	a	challenge	to	the	separation	of	subject	and	object.	Said	separation	was	a	defining	feature	of	the	fourteenth	century	European	Renaissance.	What	the	Renaissance	brought	forth	was	not	only	the	emergence	of	a	new	space	(the	continuum)	but	also,	a	newly	autonomous	subject	who	stood	apart	from	that	space	and	the	objects	therein.2	This	is	reflected	in	Descartes’	dualistic	philosophy,	which	posited	the	object	as	res	extensa,	a	thing	extended	in	space,	and	the	subject	as	res	
cogitans,	a	“thinking	thing”	entirely	without	spatial	extension,	thus	transcendent	of	space.	By	the	end	of	the	seventeenth	century,	the	trichotomous	classical	formula	was	firmly	entrenched	in	human	affairs	and	had	assumed	the	status	of	a	self-evident																																																									2	Philosopher	Owen	Barfield	conveyed	a	sense	of	how	the	world	was	experienced	prior	to	the	Renaissance:	“the	world	was	more	like	a	garment	men	[and	women]	wore	about	them	than	a	stage	on	which	they	moved….Compared	with	us,	they	felt	themselves	and	the	objects	around	them	and	the	words	that	expressed	those	objects,	immersed	together	in	something	like	a	clear	lake	of…‘meaning’”	(1988,	95).	
	 6	
intuition.	All	human	perception	was	now	generally	organized	in	terms	of	objects	appearing	in	space	before	the	gaze	of	detached	subjects.	This	new	reality	was	epitomized	in	the	subsequent	rise	of	empirical	science.	Here	the	spatial	continuum	rendered	the	object	precisely	measurable	while,	at	the	same	time,	the	object	was	divided	from	the	transcendent	subject	who	performed	the	measurement	as	if	from	outside	of	space.	Because	this	pure	act	of	measurement	was	assumed	to	leave	the	measured	object	completely	unchanged,	the	observed	properties	of	the	object	were	regarded	as	reflecting	what	the	object	really	was,	independent	of	any	distortive	influence	a	less	pristine,	space-bound	observer	might	exert.	Thus	the	operations	of	empirical	science	were	grounded	in	a	mind-independent	realism.	The	phenomena	of	quantum	physics	that	began	to	be	investigated	at	the	opening	of	the	twentieth	century	fly	in	the	face	of	realist	assumptions	about	the	world.	The	microphysical	loss	of	continuity	is	accompanied	by	a	merging	of	subject	and	object	wherein	the	subject	can	no	longer	be	taken	as	detached	from	a	spatial	continuum	within	which	objects	are	contained.	In	quantum	mechanics,	the	return	to	earth	of	the	observing	subject	registers	in	the	fact	that	the	energy	that	must	be	transferred	to	a	system	in	order	to	observe	it,	disturbs	that	system	significantly.	It	was	always	tacitly	granted	that	observing	a	system	affects	it,	but	the	influence	is	negligible	in	macroscopic	interactions	and	therefore	could	be	overlooked	in	the	classical	idealization	of	the	observer.	Microworld	observation	is	different.	Here	the	idealized	aloofness	of	the	observer	must	give	way	to	the	recognition	of	its	intimate	interaction	with	the	observed.	Of	course,	the	long-dominant	paradigm	of	mind-independence	was	not	simply	relinquished.	Just	as	a	semblance	of	continuity	could	be	maintained	in	confronting	quantum	discontinuity,	a	way	was	found	to	maintain	mind-independent	“objectivity”	when	confronted	with	the	quantum-level	intimacy	of	subject	and	object.		There	is	a	substantial	difference	between	pre-quantum	and	quantum	versions	of	the	classical	posture.	In	the	former,	we	have	objective	events	occurring	in	three-dimensional	space	before	the	detached	gaze	of	an	idealized	subject.	In	the	latter—where	the	observer’s	close	involvement	with	the	observed	cannot	merely	be	discounted,	subjectivity	itself	is	taken	as	object,	with	the	“object”	now	being	regarded	as	an	observational	event	transpiring	in	n-dimensional	Hilbert	space.	Whereas	three-dimensional	events	are	concretely	observable,	the	dimensions	of	Hilbert	space	are	sheer	abstractions.	And	the	idealized	quantum	observer	of	these	n-dimensional	acts	of	observation	is	a	further	step	removed	from	the	concrete	reality	that	constrained	his	Newtonian	predecessor.	Nevertheless,	in	both	cases,	the	traditional	stance	is	strictly	maintained.	In	both,	we	have	object-in-space-before-subject.	Thus	objectivist	quantum	mechanics	implicitly	transforms	the	old	subject	into	an	object	cast	before	a	more	abstract,	higher-order	subject.3	In	effect,	the																																																									3	Einsteinian	relativity	performs	the	same	sort	of	transformation.	That	is	why	Einstein’s	theory	is	no	more	“relative”	than	quantum	mechanics	is	“subjective.”	See	my	comparative	analysis	of	relativity	and	quantum	mechanics	(Rosen	2015).		
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quantum	mechanical	analyst	assumes	a	superordinate	vantage	point	from	which	s/he	is	able	to	consider	alternative	acts	of	classical	observation	and	weight	them	probabilistically,	with	each	act	corresponding	to	a	different	subspace	of	the	Hilbert	space.	Here	the	“objects”	to	be	analyzed	are	not	mere	concrete	substances	but	observations	themselves—what	Max	Planck	called	the	“run	of	our	perceptions”	(quoted	in	Jahn	and	Dunne	1984,	9).	If	the	“scientific	objectivity”	of	QM’s	analysis	of	observation	is	to	be	maintained,	the	implicit	observational	activity	of	the	analyst	of	observation	must	itself	be	exempted	from	the	analysis.	That	is	to	say,	two	ontologically	distinct	levels	of	observational	or	subjective	activity	have	to	exist:	that	which	is	to	be	analyzed,	and	that	through	which	the	analysis	is	to	take	place.	The	former	is	constituted	by	the	old	subjective	activity	that	is	now	objectified	within	the	framework	of	the	Hilbert	space,	whereas	the	latter	corresponds	to	the	more	abstract,	higher-order,	wholly	implicit	activity	of	the	quantum	mechanical	subject	standing	outside	of	Hilbert	space.	It	is	clear	that	this	QM	subject	assumes	the	same	detached,	“purely	objective”	stance	as	did	his	Newtonian	forerunner.	Still	operative	in	its	essential	relations	is	the	basic	formula	of	object-in-space-before-subject,	though	the	natural	intuitive	appeal	the	formula	had	held	in	the	classical	context	is	now	stretched	into	a	counter-intuitive	abstraction	that,	in	the	end,	founders	on	the	rocks	of	quantum	gravity,	as	I	intimated	above.	Summing	up,	the	quantum	world	entails	a	loss	of	spatial	continuity	coupled	with	an	intimate	fusion	of	subject	and	object	that	defies	the	classical	order	and	its	underlying	objectivist	paradigm.	We	have	seen	the	means	used	by	physicists	to	resuscitate	this	paradigm	and	I	have	questioned	the	effectiveness	these	attempts.	My	conclusion	is	that	the	objectivist,	mind-independent	tradition	does	not	appear	equal	to	the	task	of	accounting	for	quantum	reality.		What	can	we	say	about	the	mind-dependent	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics?	This	approach	to	modern	physics	puts	mind	before	matter	in	attempting	to	understand	the	quantum	world.	Thus,	according	to	the	von	Neumann-Wigner	hypothesis	(von	Neumann	1932,	elaborated	upon	in	Wigner	1961,	1967),	consciousness	is	necessary	for	collapsing	the	quantum	wave.	And	in	John	Wheeler’s	hypothesis	(1990),	the	physical	universe	arises	from	information.	How	has	the	mind-dependent	view	been	received	by	the	scientific	community?	In	2011,	an	informal	poll	was	conducted	of	physicists,	mathematicians,	and	philosophers	attending	a	physics	conference	and	it	was	found	that,	of	the	33	participants,	only	two	were	favorably	disposed	toward	mind-dependence	(see	Schlosshauer	et	al.	2013).	Why	the	distinct	lack	of	enthusiasm	for	this	view?		 I	noted	above	that	the	mind-independent	paradigm	is	aligned	with	our	everyday	experience	of	reality	as	lying	objectively	“out	there.”	Because	the	contrasting	mind-dependent	approach	posits	the	equal	or	superordinate	reality	of	the	mind	“in	here,”	it	runs	counter	to	commonsense	intuition	and	is	therefore	harder	to	accept.	But	the	objection	to	the	mind-dependent	perspective	runs	deeper	than	that.		 If	the	mind-dependent	notion	that	consciousness	causes	wave	collapse	is	taken	in	the	dualistic	spirit	of	Cartesian	interactionism,	the	notorious	mind-body	problem	arises:	how	can	such	ontologically	disparate	entities	as	mind	and	matter	
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interact?	How	is	it	possible	for	an	entity	without	extension	in	space	(res	cogitans)	to	exert	an	influence	on	an	entity	extended	in	space	(res	extensa)?	Descartes	offered	no	convincing	explanation	for	how	this	could	happen	nor	has	any	been	provided	since	his	time.		 Nevertheless,	the	mind-dependent	view	may	alternatively	be	seen	as	an	expression	of	the	monistic	philosophy	of	immaterialism.	Direct	metaphysical	assertions	of	this	doctrine	(e.g.,	Goswami	1995)	have	sometimes	been	met	with	skepticism	and	even	dismissed	as	“quantum	quackery”	(Shermer	2005),	at	least	in	part	because	many	physicists	find	it	uncomfortable	to	place	physics	squarely	within	an	overarching	metaphysical	or	religious	context.	A	more	subtle	form	of	immaterialism	was	noted	above,	one	that	is	more	acceptable	to	mainstream	physics:	John	Wheeler’s	“it	from	bit”	proposition	that	the	material	world	is	built	up	from	immaterial	units	of	information.	As	Wheeler	puts	it,	“every	physical	quantity,	every	it,	derives	its	ultimate	significance	from	bits,	binary	yes-or-no	indications,	a	conclusion	which	we	epitomize	in	the	phrase,	it	from	bit”	(1990,	309).	Philosopher	Christopher	Timpson	(2010)	examines	this	proposition	at	length.		 Timpson	begins	by	noting	that,	on	first	appraisal,	an	informational	approach	to	quantum	mechanics	does	seem	to	resolve	its	central	problem	of	measurement.	He	gives	as	an	example	the	thought	experiment	known	as	“Wigner’s	friend.”	Physicist	Eugene	Wigner	has	a	colleague	doing	an	experiment	with	particles	in	a	closed	laboratory.	Wigner	himself	is	outside	the	laboratory.	When	his	friend	reaches	the	point	of	measuring	the	spin	state	of	a	particle,	the	superposition	of	particle	states	collapses	accordingly	to	yield	a	definite	outcome.	But	Wigner	himself	is	not	privy	to	this	finding	so	that,	for	him,	the	particle	states	are	still	in	superposition.	The	question	then	concerns	the	time	at	which	the	superposition	collapses.	Was	it	when	the	friend	made	his	measurement,	or	was	it	later,	when	Wigner	became	aware	of	the	results?	As	Timpson	puts	it,	“Does	Wigner's	friend	see	a	definite	outcome,	or	is	he	left	suspended	in	limbo	until	Wigner	opens	the	door	to	say	hello?”	This	is	the	kind	of	paradox	that	arises	when	the	quantum	state	is	taken	as	representing	“how	things	are	in	the	world.”	But	if	we	take	it	as	representing	the	“information	somebody	possesses,”	the	paradox	evidently	dissolves.	There	is	no	disagreement	on	when	the	collapse	objectively	occurs	because	the	collapse	is	not	taken	as	occurring	objectively	out	there	in	the	world.	Wigner	and	his	friend	simply	have	access	to	different	information	and	when	Wigner’s	friend	tells	him	what	he	observed,	Wigner	will	update	what	he	knows	about	the	quantum	state.	This	will	occasion	no	mysterious	change	out	in	the	world,	since	the	update	strictly	concerns	the	information	one	has.	Having	laid	out	the	informational	interpretation	in	this	way,	Timpson	goes	on	to	express	his	doubts.	Echoing	physicist	John	Bell,	Timpson	suggests	the	necessity	of	asking	what	quantum	mechanical	information	is	about.	If	it	is	simply	about	what	the	outcome	of	experiments	will	be,	then	we	slide	back	into	the	Copenhagen	school’s	noncommittal,	instrumentalist	approach	to	the	meaning	of	the	quantum	world,	which	Timpson	rightly	finds	uninteresting.	The	other	alternative	is	that	the	information	is	about	the	“properties	of	a	system	which	are	possessed	prior	to	measurement	and	which	aren’t	described	by	the	quantum	state	(in	this	case	because	the	state	doesn’t	have	a	world-describing	role)”	(214).	Timpson	views	this	interpretation	of	quantum	information	
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as	implicitly	leading	us	back	to	the	search	for	variables	hidden	within	the	probabilistic	quantum	state.	For	Timpson,	such	a	move	is	self-defeating	because	hidden	variables	have	been	found	to	behave	“very	badly…([displaying]	non-locality	[and]	contexuality)”	and	“the	whole	point	of	taking	the	quantum	state	as	information	was	to	mollify	its	bad	behaviour,	its	jumping	here	and	there	we	know	not	when,	its	nonlocal	collapse”	(214).	Timpson’s	final	conclusion:	“The	informational	approach	to	the	quantum	state	seems	unable	to	survive	the	hidden	variables/instrumentalism	dilemma;	and	the	thought	that	quantum	information	theory	does	lend	support	to	a	form	of	immaterialism	really	seems	to	have	very	little	to	commend	it”	(225).			 	
2.2.	The	Husserlian	Interpretation		In	the	previous	section,	I	mentioned	a	different	version	of	the	mind-dependent	view,	namely,	the	von	Neumann-Wigner	view	of	quantum	mechanics,	which	was	further	developed	by	Wigner	(1961,	1967).	The	idea	commonly	attributed	to	Wigner	is	that	the	physical	quantum	wave	is	collapsed	by	non-physical	consciousness.	In	the	absence	of	any	real	understanding	of	how	this	could	happen,	the	action	of	consciousness	takes	on	the	appearance	of	operating	as	a	phantasmal	deus	ex	
machina,	inexplicably	swooping	in	to	effect	change	in	the	material	world.	Thus,	it	seemed	to	many	physicists	(e.g.,	Shimony	1963,	Putnam	1964)	that,	with	approaches	like	Wigner’s,	the	specter	of	Cartesian	interactionism	haunts	the	scene.		 Philosopher	Steven	French	(2019)	challenges	this	reading	of	Wigner’s	position.	According	to	French,	criticism	of	Wigner	has	been	based	on	the	mistaken	assumption	that,	in	speaking	of	the	action	of	consciousness,	Wigner	was	adhering	to	the	naïve	mind-body	dualism	in	which	consciousness	acts	on	the	physical	world	from	outside	it.	French	maintains	that,	in	fact,	Wigner	had	been	influenced	by	the	phenomenological	philosophy	of	Edmund	Husserl	wherein	consciousness	is	regarding	as	acting	immanently.		 In	French’s	interpretation	of	Wigner,	consciousness	enters	the	quantum	experiment	not	as	some	phantom	from	the	beyond,	but	through	the	auspices	of	the	experimenter’s	“objectifying	act	of	reflection”	(11).	French	holds	that,	in	observing	the	quantum	system,	the	observer	is	introspectively	aware	of	herself	doing	so	and,	through	observing	herself	in	relation	to	the	system	being	observed,	she	objectifies	that	system,	i.e.,	reduces	the	wave	function	to	a	definite	value.	To	support	this	view,	French	cites	London	and	Bauer	(1939/1983),	the	phenomenologically	oriented	physicists	who	had	influenced	Wigner’s	outlook:		 ...	it	is	not	a	mysterious	interaction	between	the	apparatus	and	the	object	that	produces	a	new	y	for	the	system	during	the	measurement.	It	is	only	the	consciousness	of	an	“I”	who	can	separate	himself	from	the	former	function	
Ψ(x,	y,	z)	and,	by	virtue	of	his	observation,	set	up	…	a	new	objectivity	in	attributing	to	the	object	henceforward	a	new	function	y(x)	=	uk(x).	(1983,	252)		 	
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By	thus	internalizing	consciousness,	it	appears	to	be	brought	into	the	quantum	picture	without	falling	prey	to	the	problem	of	Cartesian	interaction.	This	is	surely	an	important	step	in	addressing	the	shortcomings	of	the	old	realist	paradigm.	The	classical	inability	to	account	for	the	action	of	consciousness	on	matter	is	phenomenologically	remedied	by	regarding	consciousness	and	the	quantum	system	as	correlated	poles—the	“subject-pole”	and	the	“object-pole”—of	a	single	relational	act	(see	French	2019,	11).	However,	I	venture	to	suggest	that,	in	the	Husserlian	approach	to	phenomenology,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	old	paradigm	actually	persists.	I	pointed	out	earlier	that	when	physicists	were	confronted	with	the	radical	interaction	of	subject	and	object	found	in	the	quantum	world,	rather	than	relinquish	the	objectivist	worldview	upon	which	science	had	been	built,	they	introduced	a	form	of	objectivism	in	which	the	subject	was	transformed	into	a	new	object,	one	implicitly	cast	before	a	higher-order	subject.	With	the	“objectifying	act	of	reflection”	carried	out	in	the	Husserlian	quantum	laboratory,	a	subtler	version	of	the	same	sort	of	objectification	is	evidently	enacted.		 Proponents	of	traditional	objectivism	might	be	inclined	to	view	Husserlian	phenomenology	as	a	lapse	into	fuzzy	subjectivism.	This	cannot	be	further	from	the	truth.	Husserl	was	in	fact	seeking	greater	objectivity	than	what	had	been	achieved	in	the	natural	sciences.	In	Husserl’s	essay	titled	“Philosophy	As	Rigorous	Science”	(1911/1965),	naturalism	is	seen	to	contradict	itself	because	it	operates	subjectively	to	project	an	external	reality	that	is	then	naively	assumed	to	be	simply	independent	of	its	subjective	action.	The	projection	must	be	withdrawn,	says	Husserl.	In	a	fully	objective	science,	“objectivity…must	precisely	become	evident	purely	from	consciousness	itself”	(1911/1965,	90).	As	regards	the	“objectifying	act	of	reflection”	that	takes	place	in	the	quantum	laboratory	according	to	the	Husserlian	interpretation,	consciousness	applies	itself	to	itself	so	as	to	collapse	the	quantum	wave.	Elsewhere	(Rosen	2004),	I	demonstrated	that	such	a	self-objectification	entails	an	implicit	re-subjectification.		 In	rejecting	empirical	objectivism,	Husserl	dispenses	with	the	exterior	space	it	requires	for	the	observation	and	measurement	of	its	objects.	He	replaces	the	external	dimension	with	a	wholly	interior	one,	a	space	to	be	known	through	intuition	rather	than	sense	perception;	one	that	is	neither	physical	nor	empirically	psychological	but	purely	logical;	a	space	wherein	the	perfectly	self-consistent	operations	of	consciousness	are	enacted.	Of	course,	it	is	consciousness	itself	that	is	to	observe	these	operations.	Therefore,	the	observation	in	question	is	a	self-observation,	an	intuitive	self-reflection.	And	yet,	the	old	categorial	division	of	subject	and	object	is	still	at	play	in	this	immanent	realm.	For,	to	know	anything	objectively,	the	knower	or	subject	must	be	detached	from	what	s/he	knows.	In	the	paradigm	upon	which	scientific	objectivism	relies,	the	containment	of	an	object	in	space	and	the	detachment	of	the	subject	from	that	object	are	integral	aspects	of	the	same	process:	by	the	same	act	in	which	the	object	is	sealed	into	space,	the	subject	is	sealed	out,	separated	from	that	object.	No	less	does	this	apply	to	Husserl’s	phenomenological	version	of	scientific	objectivism.	If	Husserl’s	“transcendental	subject”	is	to	gain	purely	apodictic	knowledge	of	its	object—which,	in	this	case,	is	itself—it	must	become	detached	from	that	object.	The	internal	division	of	consciousness	into	subject-as-object	and	subject-as-subject	is	implied	in	Lauer’s	
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comment	that,	for	Husserlian	phenomenology,	“it	is	the	object,	not	the	subject,	that	determines	what	science	must	be,”	and	that	it	“is	the	character	of	what	is	to	be	known,	not	the	character	of	the	knower,	that	makes	phenomenology	the	only	viable	philosophical	method”	(1965,	23).	Note	the	limitation	of	Husserlian	intuition	that	results	from	its	objectivism.	It	cannot	take	in	the	actual	process	by	which	it	splits	itself	into	subject-as-object	and	subject-as-subject.	Its	grasp	is	restricted	to	the	object	alone,	which	appears	only	after	the	division	has	occurred.	The	act	of	division	itself	is	thus	not	open	to	intuitive	inquiry	but	is	simply	presupposed.	Husserlian	reflection	confines	itself	to	consciousness	as	objective	content,	as	the	objectified	subject	contained	in	the	interior	logical	space	that	has	been	established.	It	is	in	this	way	that	the	phenomenological	cogito	is	divided,	with	one	part	of	it—the	part	to	be	investigated—constituting	an	“interior	logical	object,”	and	the	other	part	of	it—that	doing	the	investigating—entailing	a	new,	higher-order	subjectivity	that	goes	uninvestigated.	The	end	result	of	this	is	the	establishment	of	a	regress	that	guarantees	the	incompleteness	of	Husserl’s	“phenomenological	reduction.”	For,	in	the	attempt	to	reach	objective	closure	on	the	“transcendental	subject”	via	the	division	of	consciousness,	subjectivity	forever	evades	the	grasp	of	intuition.	What	are	the	implications	of	Husserlian	objectivism	for	the	question	of	quantum	measurement?	In	the	macroscopic	quantum	laboratory	as	understood	by	Steven	French,	the	intuitive	act	of	self-objectification	collapses	the	quantum	wave.	Yet	even	though	this	allows	the	conclusion	that	consciousness	is	the	agent	of	collapse	and	avoids	the	problem	of	Cartesian	interaction	in	drawing	said	conclusion,	it	gives	us	no	intuitive	grasp	of	what	is	actually	being	collapsed:	the	quantum	wave	per	se.	That	is	because	the	submicroscopic	quantum	system	defies	that	to	which	Husserlian	intuition	is	limited:	the	macroscopic	field	of	strictly	objective	relations.	We	know	by	now	that	at	the	heart	of	quantum	reality	is	a	heretical	overlapping	of	subject	and	object	that	no	form	of	objectivism	is	fully	equipped	to	deal	with.	Husserlian	phenomenology	is	no	exception.	But	there	is	an	alternative	approach	to	phenomenology	that	may	be	better	suited	for	plumbing	the	quantum	depths.	And	this	approach	may	suggest	a	mode	of	perception	that	can	be	employed	effectively	with	the	extension	of	perceptual	experience	to	the	microworld	anticipated	in	section	1.		
2.3.	Ontological	Phenomenology		Husserl’s	epistemological	phenomenology	was	succeeded	by	the	ontological	phenomenologies	of	Martin	Heidegger	and	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty.	In	the	writings	of	the	latter	two,	the	emphasis	shifts	from	apodictic	knowing	to	an	investigation	of	being	as	such	(this	is	especially	true	in	the	late	works	of	these	philosophers).	For	our	purposes,	ontological	phenomenology	can	be	seen	most	essentially	as	a	critique	of	the	classical	trichotomy	of	object-in-space-before-subject.	To	Merleau-Ponty,	the	activities	of	the	detached	Cartesian	subject	are	idealizing	objectifications	of	the	world	that	conceal	the	concrete	reality	of	the	lifeworld	(a	term	Merleau-Ponty	borrowed	from	Husserl	but	put	to	different	use).	Obscured	by	the	lofty	abstractions	of	European	science,	this	earthy	realm	of	lived	experience	is	inhabited	by	subjects	
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that	are	not	anonymous,	that	do	not	fly	above	the	world,	exerting	their	influence	from	afar.	In	the	lifeworld,	the	subject	is	a	fully	situated,	fully-fledged	participant	engaging	in	transactions	so	intimately	entangling	that	it	can	no	longer	rightly	be	taken	as	separated	either	from	its	objects,	or	from	the	worldly	context	itself. As	Heidegger	put	it,	the	down-to-earth	subject	is	a	being-in-the-world	(1927/1962),	a	being	involved	in		a	much	richer	relation	than	merely	the	spatial	one	of	being	located	in	the	world....	This	wider	kind	of	personal	or	existential	“inhood”	implies	the	whole	relation	of	“dwelling”	in	a	place.	We	are	not	simply	located	there,	but	are	bound	to	it	by	all	the	ties	of	work,	interest,	affection,	and	so	on.	(Macquarrie	1968,	14–15)		 It	is	clear	that	all	three	terms	of	the	classical	formula	are	affected	by	this	phenomenological	move.	In	the	traditional	account,	objects	are	taken	as	simply	external	to	each	other	and	as	appearing	within	a	spatial	continuum	of	sheer	externality,	since	the	continuum	is	deemed	infinitely	divisible.	As	philosopher	Milič	Čapek	put	it	in	questioning	the	classical	notion	of	space,	“no	matter	how	minute	a	spatial	interval	may	be,	it	must	always	be	an	interval	separating	two	points,	each	of	which	is	external	to	the	other”	(1961,	19).	Heidegger	thus	speaks	of	conventional	space	as	the	“‘outside-of-one-another’	of	the	multiplicity	of	points”	(1927/1962,	481).	The	agents	operating	upon	the	objects	constitute	a	third	kind	of	externality,	acting	as	they	do	from	a	transcendent	vantage	point	beyond	the	objects	in	space.	It	is	this	privileging	of	external	relations	that	is	counteracted	by	ontological	phenomenology.	Notwithstanding	the	Cartesian	idealization	of	the	world,	in	the	underlying	lifeworld	there	is	no	object	with	boundaries	so	sharply	defined	that	it	is	closed	off	completely	from	other	objects.	The	lifeworld	is	characterized	instead	by	the	transpermeation	of	objects	(their	“superposition,”	in	quantum	parlance),	by	their	mutual	interpenetration,	by	the	“reciprocal	insertion	and	intertwining	of	one	in	the	other”	(Merleau-Ponty	1968,	138).	With	objects	hence	related	by	way	of	mutual	containment,	no	separate	container	is	required	to	mediate	their	relations,	as	would	have	to	be	the	case	with	externally	related	objects.	Objects	are	therefore	no	longer	to	be	thought	of	as	contained	in	space	like	things	in	a	box,	for,	in	containing	each	other,	they	contain	themselves.	At	the	same	time,	it	must	also	be	understood	that,	in	the	lifeworld,	there	can	be	no	peremptory	division	of	object	and	subject.	The	lifeworld	subject—far	from	being	the	disengaged,	high-flying	deus	ex	machina	of	Descartes	or	even	Husserl’s	transcendental	subject—finds	itself	down	among	the	objects,	is	“one	of	the	visibles”(Merleau-Ponty	1968,	135),	is	itself	always	an	object	to	some	other	subject,	so	that	the	simple	distinction	between	subject	and	object	is	confounded	and	“we	no	longer	know	which	sees	and	which	is	seen”	(139).	The	ontological	grounding	of	the	subject	is	thus	indicative	of	the	close	interplay	of	subject	and	object	in	the	lifeworld.	Generally	speaking	then,	what	the	move	from	classical	thinking	to	ontological	phenomenology	essentially	entails	is	an	internalization	of	the	relations	among	subject,	object,	and	space.			
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2.4.	The	Depth	Dimension		The	link	between	the	lifeworld	and	the	quantum	world	should	already	be	broadly	evident.	With	the	former,	the	classical	continuum	is	supplanted	by	an	internally	constituted	space	of	superposed	entities	featuring	the	intimate	interaction	of	subject	and	object.	A	more	specific	articulation	of	the	onto-phenomenological	response	to	the	problem	of	grasping	quantum	reality	can	be	derived	from	another	work	of	Merleau-Ponty.	In	his	essay	“Eye	and	Mind”	(1964),	his	concept	of	depth	provides	an	account	of	dimensionality	that	permits	us	to	better	understand	the	limitations	of	Cartesian	space	and	to	surpass	them.	For	Descartes,	notes	Merleau-Ponty,	a	dimension	is	an	extensive	continuum	entailing	“absolute	positivity”	(1964,	173).	Descartes’s	assumption	is	that	space	simply	is	there,	that	it	subsists	as	a	positive	presence	possessing	no	folds	or	nuances;	no	shadows,	shadings,	or	subtle	gradations;	no	internal	dynamism.	Space	is	thus	taken	as	the	utterly	explicit	openness	that	constitutes	a	field	of	strictly	external	relations	wherein	unambiguous	measurements	can	be	made.	Along	with	height	and	width,	depth	is	but	the	third	dimension	of	this	hypostatized	three-dimensional	field.	Merleau-Ponty	contrasts	the	Cartesian	view	of	depth	with	the	animated	depth	of	the	lifeworld,	where	we	discover	in	the	dialectical	action	of	perceptual	experience	a	paradoxical	interplay	of	the	visible	and	invisible,	of	identity	and	difference:		The	enigma	consists	in	the	fact	that	I	see	things,	each	one	in	its	place,	precisely	because	they	eclipse	one	another,	and	that	they	are	rivals	before	my	sight	precisely	because	each	one	is	in	its	own	place.	Their	exteriority	is	known	in	their	envelopment	and	their	mutual	dependence	in	their	autonomy.	Once	depth	is	understood	in	this	way,	we	can	no	longer	call	it	a	third	dimension.	In	the	first	place,	if	it	were	a	dimension,	it	would	be	the	first	one;	there	are	forms	and	definite	planes	only	if	it	is	stipulated	how	far	from	me	their	different	parts	are.	But	a	first	dimension	that	contains	all	the	others	is	no	longer	a	dimension,	at	least	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	a	certain	relationship	according	to	which	we	make	measurements.	Depth	thus	understood	is,	rather,	the	experience	of	the	reversibility	of	dimensions,	of	a	global	‘locality’	—	everything	in	the	same	place	at	the	same	time,	a	locality	from	which	height,	width,	and	depth	[the	classical	dimensions]	are	abstracted.	(1964,	180)		 Speaking	in	the	same	vein,	Merleau-Ponty	characterizes	depth	as	“a	single	dimensionality,	a	polymorphous	Being,”	from	which	the	Cartesian	dimensions	of	linear	extension	derive,	and	“which	justifies	all	[Cartesian	dimensions]	without	being	fully	expressed	by	any”	(1964,	174).	The	dimension	of	depth	is	“both	natal	space	and	matrix	of	every	other	existing	space”	(176).	Merleau-Ponty	proceeds	to	explore	the	depth	dimension	via	the	artwork	of	Cézanne.	Through	the	painter,	he	demonstrates	that	primal	dimensionality	is	self-
containing.	For	Cézanne	works	with	a	visual	space	that	is	not	abstracted	from	its	content	but	flows	unbrokenly	into	it.	Or,	putting	it	the	other	way	around,	the	contents	of	a	Cézanne	painting	overspill	their	boundaries	as	contents	so	that,	rather	
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than	merely	being	contained	like	objects	in	an	empty	box,	they	fully	participate	in	the	containment	process.	Inspired	by	Cézanne’s	paintings,	Merleau-Ponty	comments	that	“we	must	seek	space	and	its	content	as	together”	(1964,	180).	Merleau-Ponty	also	makes	it	clear	that	the	primal	dimension	engages	embodied	subjectivity:	the	dimension	of	depth	“goes	toward	things	from,	as	starting	point,	this	body	to	which	I	myself	am	fastened”	(1964,	173).	In	commenting	that,	“there	are	forms	and	definite	planes	only	if	it	is	stipulated	how	far	from	me	their	different	parts	are”	(180;	italics	mine),	Merleau-Ponty	is	conveying	the	same	idea.	A	little	later,	he	goes	further:		 The	painter’s	vision	is	not	a	view	upon	the	outside,	a	merely	“physical-optical”	relation	with	the	world.	The	world	no	longer	stands	before	him	through	representation;	rather,	it	is	the	painter	to	whom	the	things	of	the	world	give	birth	by	a	sort	of	concentration	or	coming-to-itself	of	the	visible.	Ultimately	the	painting	relates	to	nothing	at	all	among	experienced	things	unless	it	is	first	of	all	‘autofigurative.’	.	.	.	The	spectacle	is	first	of	all	a	spectacle	of	itself	before	it	is	a	spectacle	of	something	outside	of	it.	(1964,	181)		 In	this	passage,	the	painting	of	which	Merleau-Ponty	speaks,	in	drawing	upon	the	originary	dimension	of	depth,	draws	in	upon	itself.	Painting	of	this	kind	is	not	merely	a	signification	of	objects	but	a	concrete	self-signification	that	surpasses	the	division	of	object	and	subject.	In	sum,	the	phenomenological	dimension	of	depth	as	described	by	Merleau-Ponty,	is	(1)	the	“first”	dimension,	inasmuch	as	it	is	the	source	of	the	Cartesian	dimensions,	which	are	idealizations	of	it;	it	is	(2)	a	self-containing	dimension,	not	merely	a	container	for	contents	that	are	taken	as	separate	from	it;	and	it	is	(3)	a	dimension	that	blends	subject	and	object	concretely,	rather	than	serving	as	a	static	staging	platform	for	the	objectifications	of	a	detached	subject.	Therefore,	in	realizing	depth,	we	go	beyond	the	concept	of	space	as	but	an	inert	container	and	come	to	understand	it	as	an	aspect	of	a	self-containing,	indivisible	cycle	of	lifeworld	action	in	which	subject	and	object	are	integrally	incorporated.	An	action	cycle	of	this	kind	lies	at	the	core	of	quantum	mechanics.	QM’s	most	basic	equation	is	given	by	Planck:	E	=	hv. This	equation	for	the	energy	of	the	photon	can	be	rewritten	so	that	Planck’s	constant,	h,	expresses	action.	We	do	this	by	replacing	frequency	(v)	with	its	inverse,	namely,	time.	We	then	have	E	=	h/T	or	h	=	ET,	and	in	physics,	energy	multiplied	by	time	is	a	measure	of	action.	The	angularity	of	quantized	action,	its	internal	“spin,”	is	expressed	by	the	application	of	phase,	as	given	in	the	formula	h/2Π	=	!.	Here	h	is	operated	upon	by	a	phase	of	2Π	radians,	equivalent	to	a	turn	of	360°.	In	quantum	mechanics,	!	is	regarded	as	a	fundamental	“atom	of	process,”	one	not	reducible	to	smaller	units	that	could	be	applied	in	its	quantitative	analysis.	The	discontinuity	associated	with	quantized	microphysical	action	bespeaks	the	fact	that	this	indivisible	circulation	undermines	the	infinitely	divisible	classical	continuum,	and,	along	with	it,	the	idealized	objects	purported	to	be	enclosed	in	said	continuum	and	the	idealized	subject	alleged	to	stand	outside	it.	
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The	action	in	question	entails	the	superposition	of	object,	space,	and	subject—something	utterly	unthinkable	when	adhering	to	the	classical	formula.	It	is	only	through	probabilistic	artifice	that	such	a	dialectic	can	be	accommodated	while	maintaining	the	old	trichotomy.	And	just	such	a	dialectic	defines	the	depth	dimension	as	described	by	Merleau-Ponty.	Broadly	speaking,	this	suggests	that,	if	the	quantum	world	is	to	be	understood,	a	whole	new	basis	for	scientific	activity	is	required,	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	object,	space,	and	subject,	one	cast	along	the	lines	of	Merleau-Pontean	depth.		3.	MODELING	QUANTUM	PERCEPTION		Section	1	of	this	paper	began	with	a	brief	description	of	recent	research	confirming	the	ability	of	human	beings	to	detect	single	photons	and	possibly	even	to	observe	the	underlying	quantum	realm	itself.	The	key	question	for	us	is	what	this	observation	would	entail.	To	facilitate	an	understanding	of	what	quantum	perception	actually	involves,	section	2	was	devoted	to	examining	the	quantum	world	more	closely.	This	exploration	led	to	the	proposition	that	the	submicroscopic	domain	is	best	comprehended	in	terms	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	depth	dimension.	While	the	Cartesian	intuition	of	object-in-space-before-subject	makes	it	impossible	to	come	to	grips	with	the	discontinuity	and	intimate	subject-object	interaction	of	the	quantum	realm,	Merleau-Ponty’s	intuition	gives	us	the	insight	we	need.	But	can	the	philosophical	notion	of	depth	be	brought	into	sharper	focus	to	make	it	more	relevant	to	the	specific	problem	of	observing	the	photon?	For	this	we	turn	to	a	well-known	figure	from	the	psychology	of	perception.		
3.1.	The	Necker	cube:	A	Perceptual	Model	of	the	Quantum	Wave	and	Quantum	
Observation		Over	the	years,	there	has	been	much	research	in	the	field	of	bistable	perception:	the	dynamic	oscillation	of	perceptual	experience	when	an	ambiguous	stimulus	is	observed.	Perhaps	the	most	widely	studied	stimulus	of	this	kind	is	the	Necker	cube	(based	on	the	1832	observations	of	crystallographer	Louis	A.	Necker).	Atmanspacher,	Filk,	and	Römer	noted	accordingly	that	the	Necker	cube	is	a	“very	simple	and	often	investigated	example	of	bistable	perception”	(2004,	34).	
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Figure	1.	Necker	cube		 The	Necker	cube	(Fig.	1)	is	a	reversible	figure	that	projects	opposing	three-dimensional	perspectives	from	a	two-dimensional	plane.	You	may	be	perceiving	the	cube	from	the	point	of	view	in	which	it	seems	to	be	hovering	above	your	line	of	vision	when	suddenly	a	spontaneous	shift	occurs	and	you	see	it	as	if	it	lay	below.	Two	distinct	perspectives	thus	are	experienced	in	the	course	of	gazing	at	the	cube,	yet	the	cube’s	reversing	viewpoints	overlap	one	another	in	space,	are	internally	related,	completely	interdependent	(think	of	what	would	happen	to	one	perspective	if	the	other	were	erased).	The	Necker	cube’s	quantum-like	flipping	of	perspectives	brings	to	mind	the	discontinuous	phenomena	of	microphysics	and,	in	fact,	a	number	of	researchers	have	systematically	studied	the	relationship	of	the	cube	and	similar	ambiguous	stimuli	to	quantum	mechanics.	Atmanspacher,	Filk,	and	Römer	used	a	“generalized	quantum	theoretical	framework…to	model	the	dynamics	of	the	bistable	perception	of	ambiguous	visual	stimuli	such	as	the	Necker	cube”	(2004,	33).	Conte	likewise	concluded	that	“mental	states,	during	perception	and	cognition	of	ambiguous	figures,	follow	quantum	mechanics”	(Conte	et	al.	2009,	2).	In	the	same	vein,	Caglioti,	Benedek,	and	Cocchiarella	asserted	that,	in	“general	terms	we	can	say	that	perceptual	ambiguity	is	equivalent	in	the	microscopic	world	to	the	superposition	of	
quantum	states”	(2014,	37).	More	recently,	Benedek	and	Caglioti	(2019)	reaffirmed	that	the	perceptual	reversal	of	the	Necker	cube	“is	controlled	by	the	principles	of	quantum	mechanics”	(161)	and	that	“the	observation	of	an	ambiguous	figure	is	apparently	of	quantum	nature”	(165).		 Of	course,	when	we	observe	the	cube,	we	ordinarily	notice	but	a	single	perspective,	not	the	state	of	ambiguity	from	which	that	perspective	arises.	The	initially	ambiguous	situation	may	be	taken	as	preconscious,	as	“the	potential	state	of	consciousness”	(Conte	et	al.	2009,	10)	from	which	a	particular	perspective	of	the	cube	is	consciously	actualized.	In	Conte’s	quantum	mechanical	formulation,		
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we	distinguish	a	potential	and	an	actual	or	manifest	state	of	consciousness.	The	state	of	the	potential	consciousness	will	be	represented	by	a	vector	in	Hilbert	space.	If	we	indicate	for	example	a	bi-dimensional	case	with	potential	states	|1>	and	|2>	,	the	potential	state	of	consciousness	will	be	given	by	their	superposition:	ψ	=	a|1>+b|2>.	Here,	a	and	b	represent	probability	amplitudes	so	that	|a|2	will	give	the	probability	that	the	state	of	consciousness,	represented	by	percept	|1>,	will	be	finally	actualized	or	manifested	during	perception.	Conversely,	|b|2	will	represent	the	probability	that	state	(percept)	|2>	of	consciousness	will	be	actualized	or	manifested	during	perception.	It	will	be	|a|2	+	|b|2	=	1.	(Conte	et	al.	2009,	10)		“Percept	|1>”	and	“percept	|2>”	express	opposing	perspectives	of	the	Necker	cube	(or	of	another	such	ambiguous	stimulus).	What	we	are	seeing	here	is	that,	before	a	single	perspective	comes	into	conscious	focus,	it	exists	preconsciously	as	a	potential	that	overlaps	with	its	alter-perspective,	analogous	to	the	superposition	of	quantum	states	that	comprise	the	not-yet-observed	quantum	wave.	Then,	upon	observation,	the	cube	collapses	to	a	single	perspective—a	single	quantum	state,	in	the	analogy.	In	keeping	with	Bohr’s	principle	of	complementarity	rendering	conjoined	states	mutually	exclusive	in	their	actualization,	“we	can	be	aware	that	multiple	representations	are	possible	but	we	can	perceive	them	only	one	at	a	time,	that	is	serially”	(Conti	et	al.	2009,	9).	And	yet	Conti	goes	on	to	comment	that	quantum	functioning	“could	explain	the	peculiar	human	ability	to	hold	contradictory	notions	in	mind	simultaneously,	although	usually	there	is	collapse	to	one	state	or	the	other”	(15).		 In	past	work,	I	have	demonstrated	that	the	strong	tendency	to	consciously	perceive	only	one	perspective	of	the	Necker	cube	at	a	time	can	indeed	be	overcome	(Rosen	1994,	2004,	2006,	2008a).	Instead	of	allowing	our	glance	to	alternate	between	the	opposing	perspectives	of	the	cube,	we	can	break	this	visual	habit	and	view	both	perspectives	at	the	same	time.	This	possibility	is	confirmed	in	artist	Bruno	Ernst’s	(1986)	study	of	the	graphic	work	of	M.	C.	Escher.	In	analyzing	an	Escher	work	titled	Belvedere,	Ernst	concludes	that	its	design	is	based	on	the	Necker	cube.	To	bring	out	the	underlying	principle	of	Belvedere,	Ernst	provides	his	own	diagram	of	the	cube	(Fig.	2).			
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Figure	2.	Bare	Necker	cube	(a)	and	cube	with	volume	(b)		(after	Ernst,	1986,	86)		According	to	Ernst,	the	cube	encompasses	within	itself,		 the	projection	of	two	different	realities.	We	obtain	the	first	when	we	assume	that	points	1	and	4	are	close	to	us	and	points	2	and	3	are	further	away;	in	the	other	reality,	points	2	and	3	are	close	and	1	and	4	further	away....But	it	is	also	possible	to	see	points	2	and	4	in	the	front	and	1	and	3	in	the	back.	However,	this	contradicts	our	expectation	of	a	cube;	for	this	reason,	we	do	not	readily	arrive	at	such	an	interpretation.	Nevertheless,	if	we	give	some	volume	to	the	skeletal	outline	of	the	cube,	we	can	impose	said	interpretation	on	the	viewer	by	placing	A2	in	front	of	1–4	and	C4	in	front	of	3–2.	Thus	we	obtain	[Figure	2b]	and	this	is	the	basis	for	Belvedere.	(Ernst	1986,	86;	translated	by	M.	A.	Schiwy)		It	is	clear	that	Figure	2b	“contradicts	our	expectation	of	a	cube”	because	it	brings	together	opposing	“realities”	(perspectives)	that	we	are	accustomed	to	experiencing	just	one	at	a	time.	When	this	happens,	there	is	an	uncanny	sense	of	self-penetration;	the	cube	appears	to	do	the	impossible,	to	go	through	itself	(thus	Ernst	speaks	of	constructions	based	on	the	cube	as	“impossible”;	1986,	86–87).	If	we	imagine	the	bare	cube	(Figs.	1	and	2a)	as	a	solid	object	appearing	in	space,	one	whose	faces	are	filled	in,	we	find	that	perspectival	integration	has	an	interesting	effect	on	those	faces.	 In	the	conventional,	perspectivally	polarized	way	of	viewing	the	cube,	when	the	shift	is	made	from	one	pole	to	the	other,	all	the	faces	of	the	cube	that	had	been	seen	to	lie	“inside”	presently	appear	on	the	“outside,”	and	vice	versa.	But	it	is	only	at	“polar	extremes”	that	faces	are	perceived	as	either	inside	or	outside.	With	the	fusion	of	perspectives	that	discloses	what	lies	between	the	poles,	each	face	presents	itself	as	being	inside	and	outside	at	the	same	time.	Therefore,	the	division	of	inside	and	out	is	perceptually	surmounted	in	the	creation	of	a	one-sided	structure	whose	opposing	perspectives	are	simultaneously	given.	
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Simultaneously?	Well,	that	is	not	exactly	the	case.	I	am	proposing	that	we	can	apprehend	the	cube	in	a	manner	in	which	its	differing	viewpoints	overlap	in	time	as	well	as	in	space.	But	what	we	actually	experience	when	this	happens	is	not	simultaneity	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	static	juxtaposition.	We	do	not	encounter	opposing	perspectives	with	the	same	immediacy	as	figures	appearing	side	by	side	in	ordinary	space,	figures	that	coexist	in	an	instant	of	time	simply	common	to	them	(as,	for	example,	the	letters	of	the	words	on	this	page).	But	there	is	indeed	a	coincidence	in	the	integrative	way	of	viewing	the	cube,	for	perspectives	are	not	related	in	simple	succession	(first	one,	then	the	other)	any	more	than	in	simultaneity.	If	opposing	faces	are	not	immediately	co-present,	neither	do	they	disclose	themselves	merely	
seriatim,	in	the	externally	mediated	fashion	of	linear	sequence.	Instead	the	relation	is	one	of	internal	mediation,	of	the	mutual	permeation	of	opposites.	Perspectives	are	grasped	as	flowing	through	each	other	in	a	manner	that	suggests	a	blending	of	space	and	time	quite	alien	to	our	customary	perception	of	these	dimensions.	You	can	see	this	most	readily	in	viewing	Figure	2b.	When	you	pick	up	on	the	odd	sense	of	self-penetration	of	this	“impossible”	figure,	you	experience	its	two	modalities	neither	simply	at	once,	nor	one	simply	followed	by	the	other,	as	in	the	ordinary,	temporally	broken	manner	of	perception;	rather,	you	apprehend	the	dynamic	merging	and	separating	of	perspectives.	Taken	as	a	model	of	photon	perception,	the	perspectival	integration	of	the	Necker	cube	suggests	that	we	could	indeed	consciously	apprehend	superposed	states	of	the	photon,	observing	their	mutual	permeation	without	collapsing	the	wave,	thus	gaining	a	glimpse	of	the	underlying	quantum	reality.	If	the	macroscopic	perceptual	model	could	be	realized	at	the	level	of	actual	submicroscopic	perception,	would	we	observe	photon	states	as	superposed	objects	appearing	before	our	detached	gaze?	Not	if	the	quantum	dimension	is	a	dimension	of	onto-phenomenological	depth	as	I	have	proposed.	Let	us	note	how	key	properties	of	the	Necker	cube	model	those	of	the	depth	dimension.	Like	the	latter,	the	former	can	be	described	as	self-containing.	This	can	be	illustrated	in	a	simple	way	by	comparing	the	cube	with	a	square	divided	into	two	parts	(Fig.	3).	
		
Figure	3.	Divided	square	(left)	and	Necker	cube	(right)		
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	 Each	rectangular	part	of	the	square	(Fig.	3,	left)	occupies	just	half	the	total	area	of	the	square	and	is	simply	contained	inside	it.	By	contrast,	a	given	perspective	of	the	cube	(Fig.	3,	right)	encompasses	the	entire	configuration	in	expressing	itself.	This	difference	becomes	obvious	upon	realizing	that	while	you	can	erase	one	of	the	square’s	constituent	rectangles	without	affecting	the	other,	erasing	one	of	the	cube’s	perspectives	erases	the	whole	(as	noted	above).	Each	of	the	cube’s	perspectives	thus	contains	the	whole	and,	in	so	doing,	contains	itself.		 Another	principal	feature	of	the	Necker	cube	relevant	to	the	depth	dimension	is	its	one-sidedness.	We	witnessed	above	how	the	perspectival	integration	of	the	cube	creates	a	perceptual	structure	that	fuses	inside	and	outside.	Is	this	not	reminiscent	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	reflections	on	the	painting	of	Cézanne?	To	repeat:	“The	painter’s	vision	is	not	a	view	upon	the	outside,	a	merely	‘physical-optical’	[thus	external]	relation	with	the	world.	The	world	no	longer	stands	before	him	through	representation;	rather,	it	is	the	painter	to	whom	the	things	of	the	world	give	birth”	(1964,	181).	Of	course,	the	intimate	relationship	between	inside	and	outside	implicit	in	this	passage	does	not	refer	to	the	sides	of	an	object	in	space,	but	to	the	subjectivity	of	the	painter	and	his	relation	to	the	outer	world.	This	speaks	to	the	limitation	of	the	perceptual	model.	The	integrated	cube	appears	in	front	of	us	as	a	macroscopic	object	embedded	in	the	familiar	two-dimensional	space	of	the	page.	Obviously,	the	submicroscopic	photon	residing	in	a	quantum	dimension	with	the	properties	of	Merleau-Pontean	depth	is	no	such	object	in	space.	So	while	the	fusion	of	Necker	cube	sides	surely	can	be	taken	as	modeling	the	depth-dimensional	fusion	of	subject	and	object	in	the	quantum	world,	it	does	not	deliver	that	fusion	in	a	tangible	way.	We	are	about	to	discover	a	mathematical	counterpart	of	the	cube	that	does	possess	the	dimensional	structure	of	depth.	As	we	proceed,	keep	in	mind	two	essential	features	of	the	integrated	cube:	its	one-sidedness	and	its	self-penetration.		
3.2.	Topological	phenomenology		A	clue	for	tangibly	articulating	the	depth	dimension	is	found	in	the	working	notes	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	final	volume,	The	Visible	and	the	Invisible	(1968):				 Take	topological	space	as	a	model	of	being.	The	Euclidean	space	is	the	model	for	[idealized]	perspectival	being	[and	is	consistent]...with	the	classical	ontology....The	topological	space,	on	the	contrary,	[is]	a	milieu	in	which	are	circumscribed	relations	of	proximity,	of	envelopment,	etc.	[and]	is	the	image	of	a	being	that...is	at	the	same	time	older	than	everything	and	‘of	the	first	day’	(Hegel)....[Topological	space]	is	encountered	not	only	at	the	level	of	the	physical	world,	but	again	it	is	constitutive	of	life,	and	finally	it	founds	the	wild	principle	of	Logos	—	—	It	is	this	wild	or	brute	being	that	intervenes	at	all	levels	to	overcome	the	problems	of	the	classical	ontology.	(1968,	210–11)	
	
	 To	conventional	thinking,	topology	is	generally	defined	as	the	branch	of	mathematics	that	concerns	itself	with	the	properties	of	geometric	figures	that	stay	the	same	when	the	figures	are	stretched	or	deformed.	In	algebraic	topology,	structures	from	abstract	algebra	are	employed	to	study	topological	spaces.	A	more	
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concrete	approach	to	topology	is	exemplified	by	the	practical	experiments	of	mathematician	Stephen	Barr	(1964).	In	either	case,	however,	the	underlying	philosophical	default	setting	tacitly	operates,	with	topological	structures	regarded	strictly	as	objects	under	the	scrutiny	of	a	detached	analyst.	Yet,	in	the	passage	cited	above,	Merleau-Ponty	intimates	a	phenomenologically	based,	non-objectifying	form	of	topology.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	when	Merleau-Ponty	metaphorically	describes	topological	space	as	“the	image	of	a	being	that…is	older	than	everything	and	‘of	the	first	day’”	(210),	we	may	be	reminded	of	his	earlier	portrayal	of	depth:	it	is	“a	first	dimension	that	contains	all	the	others”	(1964,	180);	it	is	“both	natal	space	and	matrix	of	every	other	existing	space”	(176).	Can	we	sharpen	our	focus	on	the	depth	dimension	by	going	further	with	topology?	A	well-known	topological	curiosity	appears	especially	promising	in	this	regard:	the	Klein	bottle	(Fig.	4).	Elsewhere,	I	have	used	the	Klein	bottle	to	address	a	variety	of	philosophical	issues	(see,	for	example,	Rosen	1994,	1997,	2004,	2006,	2014).	For	our	present	purpose,	we	begin	with	a	simple	illustration.	
															 																				a	 	 	 	 	 	 	 b	
	
Figure	4.	(a)	Model	of	the	Klein	bottle	(from	Gardner	1979,	151);	(b)	diagram	of	the	parts	of	the	Klein	bottle	(after	Ryan	1993,	98)			 Figure	4b	is	my	adaptation	of	communication	theorist	Paul	Ryan’s	linear	schemata	for	the	Klein	bottle	(1993,	98).	According	to	Ryan,	the	three	basic	features	of	the	Klein	bottle	are	“part	contained,”	“part	uncontained,”	and	“part	containing.”	Here	we	see	how	the	part	contained	opens	out	(at	the	bottom	of	the	figure)	to	form	the	perimeter	of	the	container,	and	how	this,	in	turn,	passes	over	into	the	uncontained	aspect	(in	the	upper	portion	of	Fig.	4b).	The	three	parts	of	this	structure	thus	flow	into	one	another	in	a	continuous,	self-containing	movement	that	flies	in	the	face	of	the	classical	trichotomy	of	contained,	containing,	and	uncontained—symbolically,	of	object,	space,	and	subject.	But	we	can	also	see	an	aspect	of	discontinuity	in	the	diagram.	At	the	juncture	where	the	part	uncontained	passes	into	the	part	contained,	the	structure	must	intersect	itself.	Would	this	not	break	the	figure	open,	rendering	it	simply	discontinuous?	While	this	is	indeed	the	case	for	a	Klein	bottle	conceived	as	an	object	in	ordinary	space,	the	true	Klein	bottle	actually	enacts	a	dialectic	of	continuity	and	discontinuity,	as	will	become	clearer	in	further	exploring	this	peculiar	structure.	We	can	say	then	that,	in	its	highly	schematic	way,	the	one-dimensional	diagram	lays	out	symbolically	the	basic	terms	
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involved	in	the	“continuously	discontinuous”	dialectic	of	depth.	Depicted	here	is	the	process	by	which	the	three-dimensional	object	of	the	lifeworld,	in	the	act	of	containing	itself,	is	transformed	into	the	subject.	This	blueprint	for	phenomenological	interrelatedness	gives	us	a	graphic	indication	of	how	the	mutually	exclusive	categories	of	classical	thought	are	surpassed	by	a	threefold	relation	of	mutual	inclusion.	It	is	this	relation	that	is	expressed	in	the	primal	dimension	of	depth.	When	Merleau-Ponty	says	that	the	“enigma	[of	depth]	consists	in	the	fact	that	I	see	things...precisely	because	they	eclipse	one	another,”	that	“their	exteriority	is	known	in	their	envelopment,”	he	is	saying,	in	effect,	that	the	peremptory	division	between	the	inside	and	outside	of	things	is	superseded	in	the	depth	dimension.	Just	this	supersession	is	embodied	by	the	Klein	bottle.	What	makes	this	topological	surface	so	surprising	from	the	classical	standpoint	is	its	property	of	one-sidedness.	More	commonplace	topological	figures	such	as	the	sphere	and	the	torus	are	two-sided;	their	opposing	sides	can	be	identified	in	a	straightforward,	unambiguous	fashion.	Therefore,	they	meet	the	conventional	expectation	of	being	closed	structures,	structures	whose	interior	regions	(“parts	contained”)	remain	interior.	In	the	contrasting	case	of	the	Klein	bottle,	inside	and	outside	are	freely	reversible.	Thus,	while	the	Klein	bottle	is	not	simply	an	open	structure,	neither	is	it	simply	closed,	as	are	the	sphere	and	the	torus.	In	studying	the	properties	of	the	Klein	bottle,	we	are	led	to	a	conclusion	that	is	paradoxical	from	the	classical	viewpoint:	this	structure	is	both	open	and	closed.	The	Klein	bottle	therefore	helps	to	convey	something	of	the	sense	of	dimensional	depth	that	is	lost	to	us	when	the	fluid	lifeworld	relationships	between	inside	and	outside,	closure	and	openness,	continuity	and	discontinuity,	are	overshadowed	in	the	Cartesian	experience	of	their	categorical	separation.	At	this	point	it	should	be	clear	that	the	self-penetrating,	one-sided	Klein	bottle	is	the	topological	correlative	of	the	perceptually	integrated	Necker	cube.	However,	additional	work	is	required	to	confirm	that	the	Klein	bottle	is	indeed	depth-dimensional	and	not	just	an	object	in	the	three-dimensional	space	of	classical	experience.	Must	the	self-containing	one-sidedness	of	the	Klein	bottle	be	seen	as	involving	the	spatial	container?	Granting	the	Klein	bottle’s	symbolic	value,	could	we	not	view	its	inside-out	flow	from	“part	contained”	to	“part	containing”	merely	as	a	characteristic	of	an	object	that	itself	is	simply	“inside”	of	space,	with	space	continuing	to	play	the	traditional	role	of	that	which	contains	without	being	contained?	In	other	words,	despite	its	suggestive	quality,	does	the	Klein	bottle	not	lend	itself	to	classical	idealization	as	a	mere	object-in-space	just	as	much	as	any	other	structure?	A	well-known	example	of	a	one-sided	topological	structure	that	indeed	can	be	treated	as	simply	contained	in	three-dimensional	space	is	the	Moebius	strip.	Although	its	opposing	sides	do	flow	into	each	other,	this	is	classically	interpretable	as	but	a	global	property	of	the	surface,	a	feature	that	depends	on	the	way	in	which	the	surface	is	enclosed	in	space	but	one	that	has	no	bearing	on	the	closure	of	space	as	such.	Here	the	topological	structure	of	the	Moebius,	the	particular	way	its	boundaries	are	formed	(one	end	of	the	strip	must	be	twisted	before	joining	it	to	the	
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other),	can	be	seen	as	unrelated	to	the	sheer	boundedness	of	the	infinitely	many	structureless	point	elements	tightly	packed	into	the	spatial	continuum	itself.	So,	despite	the	one-sidedness	of	the	Moebius	strip,	the	three-dimensional	space	in	which	it	is	embedded	can	be	taken	as	retaining	its	simple	closure.	The	maintenance	of	a	strict	distinction	between	the	global	properties	of	a	topological	structure	and	the	local	structurelessness	of	its	spatial	context	is	mathematics’	way	of	upholding	the	underlying	classical	relation	of	object-in-space.	Given	that	the	Moebius	strip	does	lend	itself	to	drawing	said	categorical	distinction,	can	we	say	the	same	of	the	Klein	bottle?	Although	conventional	mathematics	answers	this	question	in	the	affirmative,	I	will	suggest	the	contrary.	The	schematic	representation	of	the	Klein	bottle	provided	by	Figure	4b	shows	that	it	possesses	the	curious	property	of	passing	through	itself.	When	we	consider	the	actual	construction	of	a	Klein	bottle	in	three-dimensional	space	(by	joining	one	boundary	circle	of	a	cylinder	to	the	other	from	the	inside),	we	are	confronted	with	the	fact	that	no	structure	can	penetrate	itself	without	cutting	a	hole	in	its	surface,	an	act	that	would	render	the	model	topologically	imperfect	(simply	discontinuous).	So	the	Klein	bottle	cannot	be	assembled	effectively	when	one	is	limited	to	three	dimensions.	Mathematicians	observe	that	a	form	that	penetrates	itself	in	a	given	number	of	dimensions	can	be	produced	without	cutting	a	hole	if	an	added	dimension	is	available.	The	point	is	imaginatively	illustrated	by	mathematician	Rudolf	Rucker	(1977).	He	asks	us	to	picture	a	species	of	“Flatlanders”	attempting	to	assemble	a	Moebius	strip,	which	is	a	lower-dimensional	analogue	of	the	Klein	bottle.	Rucker	shows	that,	since	the	reality	of	these	creatures	would	be	limited	to	two	dimensions,	when	they	would	try	to	make	an	actual	model	of	the	Moebius,	they	would	be	forced	to	cut	a	hole	in	it.	Of	course,	no	such	problem	with	Moebius	construction	arises	for	us	human	beings,	who	have	full	access	to	three	external	dimensions.	It	is	the	making	of	the	Klein	bottle	that	is	problematic	for	us,	requiring	as	it	would	a	fourth	dimension.	Try	as	we	might	we	find	no	fourth	dimension	in	which	to	execute	this	operation.	However,	in	contemporary	mathematics,	the	fact	that	we	cannot	create	a	proper	model	of	the	Klein	bottle	in	three-dimensional	space	is	not	seen	as	an	obstacle.	The	modern	mathematician	does	not	limit	him-	or	herself	to	the	concrete	reality	of	space	but	feels	free	to	invoke	any	number	of	higher	dimensions.	Notice	though,	that	in	summoning	into	being	these	extra	dimensions,	the	mathematician	is	extrapolating	from	the	known	three-dimensionality	of	the	concrete	world.	This	procedure	of	dimensional	proliferation	is	an	act	of	abstraction	that	presupposes	that	the	nature	of	dimensionality	itself	is	left	unchanged.	In	the	case	of	the	Klein	bottle,	the	“fourth	dimension”	required	to	complete	its	formation	remains	an	extensive	
continuum,	though	this	“higher	space”	is	acknowledged	as	but	a	formal	construct;	the	Klein	bottle	per	se	is	regarded	as	an	abstract	mathematical	object	simply	contained	in	this	hyperspace	(whereas	the	sphere,	torus,	and	Moebius	strip	are	relatively	concrete	mathematical	objects,	since	tangibly	perceptible	models	of	them	can	be	successfully	fashioned	in	three	dimensions).	We	see	here	how	the	conventional	analysis	of	the	Klein	bottle	unswervingly	adheres	to	the	classical	formulation	of	object-in-space.	Moreover,	whether	a	mathematical	object	must	be	
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approached	through	hyperdimensional	abstraction	or	it	is	concretizable,	the	mathematician’s	attention	is	always	directed	outward	toward	an	object,	toward	that	which	is	cast	before	his	or	her	subjectivity.	This	is	the	aspect	of	the	classical	stance	that	takes	subjectivity	as	the	detached	position	from	which	all	objects	are	viewed	(or,	better	perhaps,	from	which	all	is	viewed	as	object);	here,	never	is	subjectivity	as	
such	opened	to	view.	Thus	the	posture	of	contemporary	mathematics	is	faithfully	aligned	with	that	of	Descartes	and	Newton	in	whatever	topic	it	may	be	addressing.	Always,	there	is	the	mathematical	object	(a	geometric	form	or	algebraic	function),	the	space	in	which	the	object	is	contained,	and	the	seldom-acknowledged	uncontained	subjectivity	of	the	mathematician	who	is	carrying	out	the	analysis.	Now,	in	his	study	of	topology,	Barr	advised	that	we	should	not	be	intimidated	by	the	“higher	mathematician….	We	must	not	be	put	off	because	he	is	interested	only	in	the	higher	abstractions:	we	have	an	equal	right	to	be	interested	in	the	tangible”	(1964,	20).	The	tangible	fact	about	the	Klein	bottle	that	is	glossed	over	in	the	higher	abstractions	of	modern	mathematics	is	its	hole.	Because	the	standard	approach	has	always	presupposed	extensive	continuity,	it	cannot	come	to	terms	with	the	inherent	discontinuity	of	the	Klein	bottle	created	by	its	self-intersection.	Therefore,	all	too	quickly,	“higher”	mathematics	circumvents	this	concrete	hole	by	an	act	of	abstraction	in	which	the	Klein	bottle	is	treated	as	a	properly	closed	object	embedded	in	a	hyper-dimensional	continuum.	Also	implicit	in	the	mainstream	approach	is	the	detached	subjectivity	of	the	mathematician	before	whom	the	object	is	cast.	I	suggest	that,	by	staying	with	the	hole,	we	may	bring	into	question	the	classical	intuition	of	object-in-space-before-subject.	Let	us	look	more	closely	at	the	hole	in	the	Klein	bottle.	This	loss	in	continuity	is	necessary.	One	certainly	could	make	a	hole	in	the	Moebius	strip,	torus,	or	any	other	object	in	three-dimensional	space,	but	such	discontinuities	would	not	be	necessary	inasmuch	as	these	objects	could	be	properly	assembled	in	space	without	rupturing	them.	It	is	clear	that	whether	such	objects	are	cut	open	or	left	intact,	the	closure	of	the	space	containing	them	will	not	be	brought	into	question;	in	rendering	these	objects	discontinuous,	we	do	not	affect	the	assumption	that	the	space	in	which	they	are	embedded	is	simply	continuous.	With	the	Klein	bottle	it	is	different.	Its	discontinuity	does	speak	to	the	supposed	continuity	of	three-dimensional	space	itself,	for	the	necessity	of	the	hole	in	the	bottle	indicates	that	space	is	unable	to	contain	the	bottle	the	way	ordinary	objects	appear	containable.	We	know	that	if	the	Kleinian	“object”	is	properly	to	be	closed,	assembled	without	merely	tearing	a	hole	in	it,	an	“added	dimension”	is	needed.	Thus,	for	the	Klein	bottle	to	be	accommodated,	it	seems	the	three-dimensional	continuum	itself	must	in	some	way	be	opened	up,	its	continuity	opened	to	challenge.	Of	course,	we	could	attempt	to	sidestep	the	challenge	by	a	continuity-maintaining	act	of	abstraction,	as	in	the	standard	mathematical	analysis	of	the	Klein	bottle.	Assuming	we	do	not	employ	this	stratagem,	what	conclusion	are	we	led	to	regarding	the	“higher”	dimension	that	is	required	for	the	completion	of	the	Klein	bottle?	If	it	is	not	an	extensive	continuum,	what	sort	of	dimension	is	it?	I	suggest	that	it	is	none	other	than	the	dimension	of	depth	adumbrated	by	Merleau-Ponty.	Depth	is	not	a	“higher”	dimension	or	an	“extra”	dimension;	it	is	not	a	fourth	dimension	that	transcends	classical	three-dimensionality.	Rather—as	the	“first	
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dimension”	(Merleau-Ponty	1964,	180),	depth	constitutes	the	dynamic	source	of	the	Cartesian	dimensions,	their	“natal	space	and	matrix”	(176).	Therefore,	in	realizing	depth,	we	do	not	move	away	from	classical	experience	but	move	back	into	its	ground	where	we	can	gain	a	sense	of	the	primordial	process	that	first	gives	rise	to	it.	The	depth	dimension	does	not	complete	the	Klein	bottle	by	adding	anything	to	it.	Instead,	the	Klein	bottle	reaches	completion	when	we	cease	viewing	it	as	an	object-in-space	and	recognize	it	as	the	embodiment	of	depth.	It	is	the	Kleinian	pattern	of	action	(as	schematically	laid	out	in	Fig.	4b)	that	expresses	the	in-depth	relations	among	object,	space,	and	subject	from	which	the	old	trichotomy	is	abstracted	as	an	idealization.	So	it	turns	out	that,	far	from	the	Klein	bottle	requiring	a	classical	dimension	for	its	completion,	it	is	classical	dimensionality	that	is	completed	by	the	Klein	bottle,	since—in	its	capacity	as	the	embodiment	of	depth—the	Klein	bottle	exposes	the	hitherto	concealed	ground	of	classical	dimensionality.	Here	is	the	key	to	transforming	our	understanding	of	the	Klein	bottle	so	that	we	no	longer	view	it	as	an	imperfectly	formed	object	in	classical	space	but	as	the	dynamic	ground	of	that	space:	we	must	recognize	that	the	hole	in	the	bottle	is	a	hole	in	classical	space	itself,	a	discontinuity	that—when	accepted	in	dialectical	relation	to	continuity	rather	than	evaded—leads	us	beyond	the	concept	of	dimension	as	Cartesian	continuum	to	the	idea	of	dimension	as	depth.	By	way	of	summarizing	the	paradoxical	features	of	the	Klein	bottle,	I	refocus	on	the	threefold	disjunction	implicit	in	the	standard	treatment	of	the	bottle:	contained	object,	containing	space,	uncontained	subject.	(1)	The	contained	constitutes	the	category	of	the	bounded	or	finite,	of	the	immanent	contents	we	reflect	upon,	whatever	they	may	be.	These	include	empirical	facts	and	their	generalizations,	which	may	be	given	in	the	form	of	equations,	invariances,	or	symmetries.	(2)	The	containing	space	is	the	contextual	boundedness	serving	as	the	means	by	which	reflection	occurs.	(3)	The	uncontained	or	unbounded	is	the	transcendent	agent	of	reflection,	namely,	the	subject.	It	is	in	adhering	to	this	classical	trichotomy	that	the	Klein	bottle	is	conventionally	deemed	a	topological	object	embedded	in	“four-dimensional	space.”	But	the	actual	nature	of	the	Klein	bottle	suggests	otherwise.	The	concrete	necessity	of	its	hole	indicates	that,	in	reality,	this	bottle	is	not	a	mere	object,	not	simply	enclosed	in	a	continuum	as	can	be	assumed	of	ordinary	objects,	and	not	open	to	the	view	of	a	subject	that	itself	is	detached,	unviewed	(uncontained).	Instead	of	being	contained	in	space,	the	Klein	bottle	may	be	described	as	containing	itself,	thereby	superseding	the	dichotomy	of	container	and	contained.	Instead	of	being	reflected	upon	by	a	subject	that	itself	remains	out	of	reach,	we	may	say	that	the	self-containing	Kleinian	“object”	is	self-reflexive:	it	flows	back	into	the	subject	thereby	disclosing—not	a	detached	cogito,	but	the	dimension	of	depth	that	constitutes	the	dialectical	lifeworld.		In	concluding	section	2,	I	noted	the	relationship	between	Merleau-Ponty’s	lifeworld	dimension	of	depth	and	quantum	physical	action.	Having	now	fleshed	out	that	lifeworld	dimension	via	Kleinian	topology,	the	physical	significance	of	the	phenomenologically	constituted	Klein	bottle	is	clear.	The	self-containing	Klein	bottle	embodies	!,	the	quantum	of	action	associated	with	the	emission	of	radiant	energy,	of	
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photons.	In	point	of	fact,	this	connection	is	already	implicit	in	the	standard	formulation	of	the	subatomic	spin	denoted	by	!,	though	the	relationship	is	well	disguised.	The	odd	quantized	spinning	was	modeled	by	Wolfgang	Pauli	via	complex	numbers.	Musès	(1976)	suggested	that	Pauli’s	spin	matrices	are	actually	based	on	a	kind	of	complex	number	or	“hypernumber”	that	goes	beyond	Pauli’s	imaginary	i:	the	hypernumber	ε	(defined	as	ε2	=	+1,	but	ε	≠	±	1).	What	I	demonstrated	elsewhere	(Rosen	2008a)	is	that	the	geometric	counterpart	of	ε	is	the	Klein	bottle.	In	the	form	of	ε!,	the	Klein	bottle	is	thus	seen	to	implicitly	express	the	electromagnetic	angular	action	that	lies	at	the	core	of	quantum	mechanics.	And	recognizing	the	relationship	between	Kleinian	depth	and	radiant	energy	prepares	us	to	return	to	the	question	with	which	this	essay	began.		4.	PROPRIOCEPTIVE	QUANTUM	PERCEPTION		This	article	was	inspired	by	recent	research	into	the	possibility	that	human	beings	can	perceive	single	photons,	and,	in	so	doing,	directly	probe	the	underlying	quantum	reality.	Despite	the	ephemeral	aspects	of	laboratory	studies	in	the	field	of	photon	perception	discussed	in	section	1,	researchers	have	voiced	hope	that	progress	can	be	made.	Of	course,	the	new	experiments	have	only	just	confirmed	that	single	photons	are	detectable;	this	is	a	far	cry	from	establishing	that	photons	can	be	consciously,	accurately,	and	reliably	perceived.	Biophysical	anthropologist	William	Bushell	does	observe	that	the	aim	of	certain	non-Western	meditational	practices	is	to	significantly	enhance	perceptual	acuity.	Thus,	the	“specifically	stated	goal	of	the	Indo-Tibetan	yogic	tradition	is	to	directly	perceive	the	miniscule,	the	microscopic,	and	beyond”	(2016,	34).	Bushell	speaks	in	general	“of	how	intensively	trained	individuals—adepts	or	virtuosi	of	special	meditational	techniques…	appear	to	be	potentially	capable	of	radically	enhancing	their	sensory	perceptual	capacities	to	the	point	of	…	directly	perceiving	light	at	the	scale	of	single	photons”	(31).	Though	this	and	other	approaches	designed	to	enhance	micro-perception	await	further	clarification	and	development,	let	us	proceed	from	the	premise	that	observers	can	indeed	be	trained	to	proficiently	perceive	at	the	scale	of	single	photons	and	the	quantum	reality	associated	with	them.	What	then?	Our	conceptual	exploration	has	led	us	to	the	conclusion	that	the	photon’s	action	is	best	understood	as	a	spinning	akin	to	the	action	of	the	Kleinian	depth	dimension—a	dimension	in	which	subject	and	object,	observer	and	observed,	are	themselves	superposed.	What	this	suggests	is	that	the	photon	could	not	be	observed	directly	while	at	the	same	time	maintaining	the	objectifying	stance	of	empirical	tradition.	It	would	be	futile	for	the	would-be	observer	of	the	photon	to	continue	in	the	posture	of	a	detached	subject	before	whom	objects	are	cast.	In	dealing	with	the	depth-dimensional	actuality	of	the	photon,	the	observer	evidently	would	need	to	enter	into	it	with	his	or	her	own	subjectivity.	No	longer	could	she	remain	a	disinterested	bystander,	for	her	active	presence	would	be	required	to	make	the	observation	in	a	concrete	way.	Therefore,	rather	than	approaching	the	photon	as	an	object	from	which	she	is	detached,	she	would	need	to	approach	it	phenomenologically,	relating	more	intimately	to	it,	immersing	herself	in	its	
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lifeworld.	Here	she	would	become	“one	of	the	visibles”	(Merleau-Ponty	1968,	135)	and,	in	her	interaction	with	the	photon,	she	would	no	longer	sharply	divide	the	photon	seen	from	herself,	the	seer.	What	would	such	a	radical	change	in	observational	posture	specifically	entail?	We	may	begin	to	address	this	question	by	turning	to	the	work	of	the	philosopher	of	science	Evelyn	Fox-Keller.		
4.1.	Dynamic	Objectivity		Fox-Keller	calls	for	a	new	form	of	scientific	inquiry	that	she	names	“dynamic	objectivity”	(1985,	115).	The	old	approach,	she	says,	involves	a	“static	objectivity”	in	which	“the	pursuit	of	knowledge...begins	with	the	severance	of	subject	from	object”	(117).	In	contrast,	“dynamic	objectivity	aims	at	a	form	of	knowledge	that	grants	to	the	world	around	us	its	independent	integrity	but	does	so	in	a	way	that	remains	cognizant	of,	indeed	relies	on,	our	connectivity	with	that	world”	(1985,	117).	Elaborating	further:		Dynamic	objectivity	is…a	pursuit	of	knowledge	that	makes	use	of	subjective	experience	(Piaget	calls	it	consciousness	of	self)	in	the	interests	of	a	more	effective	objectivity.	Premised	on	continuity	[of	self	and	other],	it	recognizes	difference	between	self	and	other	as	an	opportunity	for	a	deeper	and	more	articulated	kinship....To	this	end,	the	scientist	employs	a	form	of	attention	to	the	natural	world	that	is	like	one's	ideal	attention	to	the	human	world:	it	is	a	form	of	love.	The	capacity	for	such	attention,	like	the	capacity	for	love	and	empathy,	requires	a	sense	of	self	secure	enough	to	tolerate	both	difference	and	continuity."	(1985,	117–18)		 Writing	in	the	same	vein,	Fox-Keller	adduces	Ernest	Schachtel's	distinction	between	“autocentric”	and	“allocentric”	perception.	Whereas	the	former	is	“dominated	by	need	or	self-interest,”	the	latter	“is	perception	in	the	service	of	a	love	‘which	wants	to	affirm	others	in	their	total	and	unique	being.’	It	is	an	affirmation	of	objects	as	‘part	of	the	same	world	of	which	man	is	a	part,’”	one	which	“permits	a	fuller,	more	‘global’	understanding	of	the	object	in	its	own	right”	(119).	Although	Fox-Keller	pays	scant	attention	to	phenomenological	philosophy,	citing	none	of	its	leading	figures,	the	main	thrust	of	her	presentation	is	much	in	keeping	with	phenomenology's	central	aim,	as	expressed	in	its	well-known	slogan:	“To	the	things	themselves!”	And	it	seems	clear	that	the	world	shared	by	the	“allocentric”	observer	and	the	objects	that	s/he	observes	parallels	the	lifeworld	of	phenomenology.	Fox-Keller	helps	us	gain	a	better	grasp	of	the	new	mode	of	scientific	inquiry	by	offering	a	specific	example	of	one	of	its	premier	practitioners:	the	Nobel	prize-winning	biologist,	Barbara	McClintock.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	detached,	dispassionate	attitude	of	the	Cartesian	scientist,	McClintock	speaks	of	obtaining	an	intimate	feeling	for	the	plants	she	works	with:	“‘I	don't	feel	I	really	know	the	story	if	I	don't	watch	the	plant	all	the	way	along.	So	I	know	every	plant	in	the	field.	I	know	them	intimately,	and	I	find	it	a	great	pleasure	to	know	them’”	(Fox-Keller	1985,	164).	In	another	place,	McClintock	“describes	the	state	of	mind	accompanying	the	
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crucial	shift	in	orientation	that	enabled	her	to	identify	chromosomes	she	had	earlier	not	been	able	to	distinguish”	(165):		 “I	found	that	the	more	I	worked	with	them,	the	bigger	and	bigger	[the	chromosomes]	got,	and	when	I	was	really	working	with	them	I	wasn't	outside,	I	was	down	there.	I	was	part	of	the	system....It	surprised	me	because	I	actually	felt	as	if	I	was	right	down	there	and	these	were	my	friends....As	you	look	at	these	things,	they	become	part	of	you.	And	you	forget	yourself.”	(McClintock	quoted	in	Fox-Keller	1985,	165)		Fox-Keller	observes	that	McClintock's	vocabulary	“is	consistently	a	vocabulary	of	affection,	of	kinship,	of	empathy,”	an	empathy	that	constitutes	“the	highest	form	of	love:	love	that	allows	for	intimacy	without	the	annihilation	of	difference”	(164).	Here	the	word	“love”	is	used	“neither	loosely	nor	sentimentally,	but	out	of	fidelity	to	the	language	McClintock	herself	uses	to	describe	a	form	of	attention,	indeed	a	form	of	thought”	(164).	Fox-Keller	arrives	at	these	conclusions:		The	crucial	point	for	us	is	that	McClintock	can	risk	the	suspension	of	boundaries	between	subject	and	object	without	jeopardy	to	science	precisely	because,	to	her,	science	is	not	premised	on	that	division.	Indeed,	the	intimacy	she	experiences	with	the	objects	she	studies...is	a	wellspring	of	her	powers	as	a	scientist....In	this	world	of	difference,	division	is	relinquished	without	generating	chaos.	Self	and	other,	mind	and	nature	survive	not	in	mutual	alienation,	or	in	symbiotic	fusion,	but	in	structural	integrity.	(164–165)		Finally,	after	recounting	the	goal	of	conventional	science,	Fox-Keller	observes	that,	“To	McClintock,	science	has	a	different	goal:	not	prediction	per	se,	but	understanding;	not	the	power	to	manipulate,	but	empowerment—the	kind	of	power	that	results	from	an	understanding	of	the	world	around	us,	that	simultaneously	reflects	and	affirms	our	connection	to	that	world”	(166).	The	world	to	which	McClintock	is	connected	in	feeling	and	embodied	empathy	bears	kinship	with	the	depth-dimensional	lifeworld	of	phenomenology.	It	is	a	world	in	which	the	dialectic	of	difference	and	identity	is	enacted	through	an	intimate	knowledge	of	other	that	requires	and	is	inseparable	from	the	knowledge	of	self	(Piaget’s	“consciousness	of	self”).	McClintock's	“revolution	that	‘will	reorganize...the	way	we	do	[scientific]	research’”	(Fox-Keller	1985,	172)	depends	on	relaxing	our	commitment	to	the	classical	ideal	of	object-in-space-before-subject	and	descending	from	the	Cartesian	stratosphere	to	immerse	ourselves	in	a	world	where	object	and	subject	mediate	one	another	internally	in	an	encompassing	circular	flow.	Of	course,	while	McClintock	studied	chromosomes,	the	central	concern	of	the	present	paper	is	with	photons.	Unlike	the	photon,	the	chromosome	is	not	a	native	of	the	quantum	domain	and,	although	McClintock	cultivated	a	uniquely	intimate	relationship	with	this	molecular	structure,	other	biological	researchers	have	been	able	to	strike	a	more	dispassionate,	conventional	posture,	treating	chromosomes	as	objects	from	which	they	are	largely	detached.	Whereas	the	chromosome	does	allow	
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for	such	treatment,	the	single	photon	does	not.	To	sharpen	our	understanding	of	why	this	is	so,	let	us	take	a	closer	look	at	the	photon.		
4.2.	The	Phenomenon	of	Light		Modern	physics	is	a	child	of	the	electromagnetic	age.	Two	of	its	greatest	experiments	centered	on	the	phenomenon	of	light.	The	results	of	Planck’s	experiment	on	blackbody	radiation	provided	the	impetus	for	quantum	mechanics,	and	an	earlier	experiment	on	light	conducted	by	Michelson	and	Morley	in	1887	created	a	puzzling	problem	subsequently	addressed	by	Einstein’s	theory	of	relativity	(1905).		The	Michelson-Morley	research	raised	doubts	about	the	luminiferous	ether	that	Maxwell	had	imagined	to	be	the	medium	for	propagating	electromagnetic	energy.	Just	as	relatively	crude	mechanical	phenomena	like	water	waves	and	sound	waves	could	be	taken	as	transmitted	through	Newtonian	space	via	the	media	of	water	and	air	(respectively),	Maxwell	supposed	that	the	subtler	electromagnetic	energy	he	was	investigating	was	transmitted	through	the	ether,	a	highly	refined	medium	thought	to	pervade	the	whole	universe.	Possessing	few	properties	and	no	action	of	its	own,	the	ether	was	presumed	to	serve	exclusively	as	the	framework	within	which	the	continuous	motions	of	coarser	substances	could	be	measured	and	analyzed—including	the	motion	of	light.	Maxwell’s	ether	hypothesis	reflected	the	underlying	idea	that	light	could	be	viewed	as	a	mechanical	force	that	passed	through	the	Newtonian	continuum	like	any	other	force—in	other	words,	that	light	could	be	treated	as	an	object	in	space	that	could	be	observed	objectively	by	a	Newtonian	subject	detached	from	that	space.	In	so	postulating	the	existence	of	a	luminiferous	ether,	the	old	formula	of	object-in-space-before-subject	was	tacitly	maintained.	But	the	postulate	proved	untenable.	If	it	were	true	that	light	moved	through	a	motionless	ethereal	continuum,	then	a	key	principle	of	classical	mechanics	should	apply:	the	addition	of	velocities.	Assuming	light	to	propagate	through	the	ether	at	the	absolute	speed	of	c	(~186,000	mps),	a	traveler	moving	toward	a	beam	of	light	should	observe	the	beam	to	be	approaching	her	at	a	velocity	greater	than	c,	her	own	velocity	being	added	to	c	to	obtain	the	higher	relative	velocity.	Similarly,	if	the	light	beam	and	the	observer	are	moving	away	from	each	other	through	the	ether,	the	relative	velocity	of	the	light	beam	would	be	less	than	c,	the	observer’s	velocity	now	being	subtracted	from	c.	What	Michelson	and	Morley	discovered	was	that	the	velocity	of	light	actually	always	appeared	to	be	the	same,	regardless	of	its	direction	of	motion	relative	to	the	observer.	This	astonishing	result	sounded	the	death	knell	of	the	ether	theory.		 The	result	of	the	Michelson-Morley	experiment	was	indeed	baffling	to	the	classical	“eye.”	Is	it	not	an	obvious	fact	of	perception	that,	if	I	change	my	perspective	on	an	object	I	am	viewing,	its	appearance	will	change	accordingly?	What	the	experiment	demonstrated	in	its	abstract	way	was	that,	when	the	“object”	being	considered	is	light,	the	familiar	principle	of	perspective	does	not	apply.	It	would	certainly	look	strange	to	me	if	I	got	up	from	this	computer	screen	I	am	sitting	at,	moved	all	the	way	to	the	right	of	it	so	that	I	was	viewing	the	screen	at	an	acute	angle,	but	found	that	the	screen	had	the	same	full,	square	appearance	as	when	I	was	sitting	
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directly	in	front	of	it!	Analogously,	this	is	what	Michelson	and	Morley	“saw”	when	they	looked	at	light	from	different	“angles”	(reference	frames).	This	strange	outcome	made	it	clear	that	the	phenomenon	of	light	does	not	behave	the	way	mechanical	phenomena	do,	thus	suggesting	that	electromagnetic	phenomena	are	not	strictly	governed	by	the	classical	laws	of	Newtonian	space.	But	just	why	was	it	that	the	velocity	of	light	did	not	change	regardless	of	the	frame	of	reference	that	Michelson	and	Morley	adopted?	Why	did	light	“look”	the	same	to	them	no	matter	what	perspective	upon	it	they	assumed?	I	propose	it	was	because,	in	confronting	the	phenomenon	of	light,	they	were	not	encountering	an	object	to	be	seen,	but	that	by	which	they	saw.	In	this	regard,	cosmologist	Arthur	Young	(1976)	commented	that	while	the	conventional	“scientist…likes	to	think	of	[a	particle	of]	light	as	‘just	another	kind	of	particle,’…light	is	not	an	objective	thing	that	can	be	investigated	as	can	an	ordinary	object….Light	is	not	seen;	it	is	[the]	seeing”	(11).		The	physicist	Mendel	Sachs	reached	a	similar	conclusion	in	his	inquiry	into	the	meaning	of	light:	“What	is	‘it’	that	propagates	from	an	emitter	of	light,	such	as	the	sun,	to	an	absorber	of	light,	such	as	one’s	eye?	Is	‘it’	truly	a	thing	on	its	own,	or	is	it	a	manifestation	of	the	coupling	of	an	emitter	to	an	absorber?”	(1999,	14).	Sachs’s	rhetorical	question	intimates	that	light—instead	of	lending	itself	to	being	treated	as	an	object	open	to	the	scrutiny	of	a	subject	that	stands	apart	from	it—must	be	understood	as	entailing	the	inseparable	blending	of	object	and	subject	(Rosen	2004,	20;	2008a,	164).	This	computer	screen	surely	does	not	look	the	same	to	me	from	every	perspective,	but	would	not	my	viewing	of	the	screen	look	the	same?	In	attempting	to	observe	the	light	by	which	the	screen	is	perceived,	it	seems	I	would	be	confronted	with	the	prospect	of	“viewing	my	own	viewing,”	and	this	would	mean	that	I	would	not	encounter	the	concrete	variations	in	appearance	that	attend	the	observation	of	an	object	from	a	viewpoint	that	itself	is	not	viewed.	At	bottom	then,	the	finding	of	Michelson	and	Morley	evidently	called	into	question	the	classical	intuition	of	object,	space,	and	subject	that	had	implicitly	governed	the	work	of	science	for	many	centuries.	Elsewhere	(Rosen	2008a	and	2015),	I	deal	with	Einstein’s	objectivist	attempt	to	come	to	terms	with	the	enigma	of	light.	There	I	recount	the	apparent	success	of	his	relativity	theory	and	its	ultimate	failure,	and	I	point	out	its	underlying	correspondence	to	the	objectivism	of	mainstream	quantum	mechanics:	rather	than	accepting	the	irreducible	element	of	subjectivity	that	lies	at	the	core	of	modern	physics,	both	theories	seek	to	save	objectivism	by	objectifying	the	subject	itself.	Given	the	purpose	and	scope	of	the	present	paper,	I	will	not	elaborate	further	on	relativity	theory.	I	refer	the	reader	to	my	earlier	writing	on	the	subject,	and	to	note	3	of	this	paper.	Interestingly,	the	topic	of	light	plays	a	significant	role	in	ontological	phenomenology.	We	might	say	that	Merleau-Ponty’s	study	of	Cézanne’s	“autofigurative”	art	essentially	studies	the	paradox	of	light	(see	section	2.4).	Heidegger,	for	his	part,	is	quite	explicit	about	the	importance	of	light	to	phenomenological	thought.	After	acknowledging	the	contributions	of	Hegel	and	Husserl	in	surpassing	the	old	mechanistic	objectivism	and	making	subjectivity	“the	matter	of	philosophy”	(1964/1977,	383),	Heidegger	comments	that—in	this	
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thinking	of	subjectivity	into	its	own,	“to	its	ultimate	originary	givenness…to	its	own	presence”	(383),	something	remains	unthought:		 What	remains	unthought	in	the	matter	of	philosophy	as	well	as	in	its	method?	[Hegel’s]	speculative	dialectic	is	a	mode	in	which	the	matter	of	philosophy	[i.e.	subjectivity]	comes	to	appear	of	itself	and	for	itself,	and	thus	becomes	present.	Such	appearance	necessarily	occurs	in	some	light.	Only	by	virtue	of	light,	i.e.,	through	brightness,	can	what	shines	show	itself,	that	is,	radiate.	(383)		Evidently	then,	what	remains	unthought	in	the	history	of	philosophy	is	the	phenomenon	of	light,	or	what	Heidegger	later	calls	enargeia	(“that	which	in	itself	and	of	itself	radiates	and	brings	itself	to	light”;	385).	It	is	clear	that,	for	Heidegger,	enargeia	or	light	is	not	merely	a	local,	objectively	observable	phenomenon,	not	just	a	finite	particular	being.	Heidegger	implicitly	associates	light	with	Being,	with	“presence	as	such,”	rather	than	just	with	“what	is	present”	(1964/1977,	390).	And,	according	to	philosopher	Carol	Bigwood,	while	Heideggerian	“Being	is	not	a	being,”	neither	is	it	a	“God	[or]	an	absolute	unconditional	ground…but	is	simply	the	living	web	within	which	all	relations	emerge”	(1993,	3).	That	is	to	say,	Be-ing	constitutes	the	dimension	of	dynamic	life	process,	the	lifeworld	dimension.	From	this	we	can	conclude	that	light,	or,	more	generally,	electromagnetism,	indeed	comprises	a	non-classical	dimension	unto	itself,	an	entire	lifeworld	of	intimate	subject-object	interaction.	Thus,	light	as	such	(as	opposed	to	that	which	merely	is	lit),	light	as	quantized	Kleinian	action	(ε!),	is	the	paradoxical	phenomenon	that	gives	physical	significance	to	Merleau-Ponty’s	dimension	of	depth.		 Now,	the	thought	experiment	illustrating	the	aperspectival	nature	of	light	implicit	in	the	Michelson-Morley	research	brings	to	mind	our	perceptual	experiment	with	the	Necker	cube	(section	3.1).	Ordinarily,	we	perceive	one	perspective	of	the	cube	at	a	time	and,	in	shifting	from	one	to	the	other,	we	observe	the	kind	of	difference	we	would	expect	to	see	in	changing	the	angle	from	which	we	view	an	object:	the	faces	of	the	cube	that	appeared	inside	before	the	shift	now	appear	outside	and	vice	versa,	as	if	we	had	moved	around	a	solid	object	and	were	viewing	it	from	a	different	angle,	one	that	had	changed	the	visibility	of	its	surfaces,	concealing	some,	uncovering	others	(the	concealed	surfaces	of	the	solid	object	correspond	to	the	interior	faces	of	the	Necker	cube	and	the	visible	surfaces	of	the	solid	correspond	to	the	exterior	faces	of	the	cube).	But	with	the	integration	of	the	cube,	perspectives	are	superposed	upon	each	other.	In	penetrating	one	another,	each	perspective	encompasses	the	whole	cube	so	that	the	integrated	cube	can	be	said	to	penetrate	itself.	 Of	course,	there	is	the	limitation	of	macroscopic	perception	noted	in	the	previous	section.	Though	the	cube’s	perspectives	are	superposed	to	give	a	one-sided	experience	that	can	symbolize	the	integration	of	subject	and	object	found	in	the	depth-dimensional	phenomenon	of	light,	the	cube	appears	before	us	as	but	an	object	in	space.	Clearly	then,	the	classical	formula	holds	sway	in	relation	to	the	large-scale	
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external	world.	Here	the	self-penetration	of	the	integrated	cube	does	not	literally	penetrate	the	one	who	views	it.	Here	the	observer	does	not	draw	back	in	upon	herself	to	observe	her	own	observing,	uniting	observer	and	observed	in	the	process.	Quantum	physics	tells	us	that	it	is	in	the	submicroscopic	realm	where	such	a	union	can	take	place.	This	is	where,	in	viewing	the	particle	of	light,	one	must	view	one’s	own	viewing	in	a	reflexive	act	of	self-penetration,	as	we	will	soon	see.		 The	difference	between	observing	the	submicroscopic	photon	and	viewing	larger	scaled	phenomena	applies	not	only	to	the	Necker	cube	but	to	McClintock’s	chromosomes	as	well.	Like	the	cube,	the	chromosome	appears	before	the	observer	as	an	entity	in	ordinary	space.	The	chromosome	is	thus	objectifiable,	whereas	the	photon	is	not.	This	difference	is	ontological.	It	was	Heidegger	(1927/1962)	who	emphasized	the	importance	of	what	he	called	the	“ontological	difference.”	The	crucial	distinction	is	that	between	the	“ontical”	and	the	“ontological.”	Although	Heidegger	himself	provided	no	explicit	definitions	of	these	terms,	his	translators	did:	“Ontological	inquiry	is	concerned	primarily	with	Being;	ontical	inquiry	is	concerned	primarily	with	entities	and	the	facts	about	them”	(Macquarrie	and	Robinson	in	Heidegger	1927/1962,	31,	n.3).	According	to	philosopher	David	Michael	Levin	(1985),	while	this	“fundamental	difference...between	Being	and	beings...is	both	basic	and	simple,	its	articulation	and	understanding	are	matters	of	the	greatest	difficulty”	(10).	Levin	proposes:		 [A]	fruitful	way	of	formulating	the	ontological	difference	is	to	articulate	it	as	the	difference	between	the	horizon,	field,	or	clearing	within	which	beings	appear,	and	the	various	beings	themselves;	or	as	the	difference	between	the	ground	of	significance	itself	and	the	figures	which	appear	in	its	setting	and	stand	out	from	the	ground.	Being	is	not	a	being,	but	rather	the	dimensionality	within	which	all	beings	are	to	be	encountered.	(11;	italics	added)		 The	ontological	difference	can	be	clarified	further	by	recognizing	that,	if	Being	is	a	dimensional	context	or	background,	it	cannot	be	so	in	the	same	sense	that	classical	space	serves	as	background.	For	Being	is	not	just	the	ground	from	which	
figures	stand	out;	it	is	not	merely	that	which	functions	as	a	framework	or	container	of	objects;	rather,	the	objects	and	their	spatial	background	emerge	from	Being,	along	with	the	detached	subject	who	reflects	upon	those	objects.	In	other	words,	what	stands	out	from	Being,	what	Being	opens	up	and	first	makes	possible,	is	object-in-
space-before-subject.			 The	ontological	difference	is	reflected	in	the	difference	between	the	ontical	phenomena	of	the	classical	world	and	the	ontological	phenomena	of	the	quantum	world.	We	have	seen	that	the	quantum	dimension	is	the	“first	dimension”	(Merleau-Ponty	1964,	180),	the	“natal	space	and	matrix	of	every	other	existing	space”	(176).	Thus	the	large-scale	Cartesian	dimensions	are	first	projected	from	the	submicroscopic	depth	dimension.	The	ordinary	course	of	perception	follows	this	movement	from	the	pre-objective	domain	into	the	familiar	realm	of	object-in-space-before-subject.	In	moving	out	of	the	former,	quantum	reality	is	relegated	to	oblivion	and	perception	implicitly	becomes	a	process	of	objectification	(as	exemplified	by	the	phenomenon	of	binocular	convergence	discussed	in	the	next	section).	It	seems	then	
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that,	if	we	wish	to	reenter	the	quantum	domain	to	observe	the	photon,	we	must	reverse	the	long-dominant	direction	in	which	perception	operates.	The	projection	of	object-in-space-before-subject	must	be	withdrawn	in	an	act	that	carries	perception	back	to	its	ontological	origin.		
4.3.	Observing	the	Photon	Through	Proprioception		We	are	entertaining	the	possibility	that	the	single	photon	and	its	associated	quantum	field	can	be	consciously	perceived.	I	have	indicated	that	this	would	call	for	a	radical	change	in	the	way	in	which	observations	are	performed.	In	a	recursive	move,	the	observer	would	need	to	shift	gears	and	bring	her	attention	backward	to	the	source	of	the	observing	process.	Through	this	reversal,	observer	and	observed	would	become	intimately	related;	they	themselves	would	become	superposed.		Or	we	could	say—bearing	in	mind	the	ontological	nature	of	light—that	in	order	to	see	the	photon,	one	would	need	to	be	the	photon.	I	will	now	explore	further	what	this	new	form	of	observation	would	entail.	The	movement	of	perception	away	from	its	quantum	ontological	source	into	the	ontical	Cartesian	realm	is	similar	to	the	“from-to”	action	of	experience	described	by	the	phenomenologist	Drew	Leder	(1990,	15–17).	Ordinarily,	in	whatever	we	see,	we	“cannot	see	our	own	seeing”	(17),	since	our	seeing	is	what	we	see	from.	By	upholding	the	categorical	distinction	between	what	we	see	and	what	we	see	from,	the	subject-object	dichotomy	is	enforced:	sight	is	directed	to	an	object	seen,	from	a	subjective	perspective.	The	movement	is	normally	assumed	to	be	irreversible,	making	it	impossible	to	view	subjectivity	as	such	(see	related	discussion	of	Michelson-Morley	experiment,	above).	In	our	bid	to	observe	the	ontological	photon,	are	we	presently	looking	to	challenge	the	assumption	of	perception’s	irreversibility	by	transposing	the	subject-object	relation	in	such	a	way	that	we	can	know	the	subject	per	se?	It	was	Husserl	who	had	hoped	to	know	the	subject	(and	with	even	greater	“objectivity”	than	the	object	had	once	been	known).	Heidegger,	for	his	part,	did	not	merely	call	for	a	reversal	of	the	inclination	to	pass	from	subject	to	object;	he	called	for	a	reversal	of	the	subject-object	dichotomy,	thereby	enabling	us	to	move	back	into	the	“the	living	web	within	which	all	relations	emerge”	(Bigwood	1993,	3),	which	is	to	say:	into	the	quantum	sphere	of	Being.	The	gearing	of	awareness	is	all-important	to	the	reversal	in	question.	In	order	to	perceive	the	single	photon,	it	is	not	enough	to	change	the	direction	of	perception;	its	“gear”	must	be	reversed	so	that	it	is	no	longer	simply	moving	ahead.	Were	we	to	proceed	toward	the	photon	in	this	“forward	gear,”	we	would	be	attempting	to	“turn	around”	upon	this	ontological	source—like	turning	a	car	around	so	that	it	now	faces	the	direction	from	which	it	was	previously	facing.	In	such	a	reversal,	we	would	indeed	be	inclined	to	face	the	photon,	to	have	it	appear	before	us,	over	against	our	consciousness.	With	perception	thus	geared,	we	would	still	be	trying	to	objectify	the	photon,	but	would	only	succeed	in	obscuring	it—collapsing	the	“ontological	wave,”	rendering	the	quantum	world	ontical,	rather	than	experiencing	it	in	its	actual	form.	We	cannot	know	the	photon	by	simply	turning	around	upon	it	any	more	than	turning	a	car	180°	to	face	the	direction	from	which	it	
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had	been	facing	allows	us	to	capture	that	“from”	as	it	was	initially	experienced;	such	a	turning	merely	turns	the	old	“from”	into	a	new	“to”	that	is	seen	from	a	new	perspective.	It	is	clear	that	the	attempt	to	grasp	the	“from”	of	the	photon	while	maintaining	the	forward	orientation	is	futile;	to	make	such	an	effort	is	to	“chase	one’s	tail,”	to	turn	in	a	vicious	circle.	The	implication	of	Heidegger’s	work	is	that	perception	must	shift	into	a	different	gear.	If	we	are	to	apprehend	the	ontological	photon	qua	photon,	we	must	approach	it	in	“reverse.”	Notice	that,	whereas	turning	a	car	around	to	face	in	the	opposite	direction	turns	us	away	from	the	original	direction	in	which	we	faced,	if	we	shift	into	reverse,	we	continue	to	face	in	the	same	direction.	A	similar	distinction	can	be	made	with	respect	to	the	ontological	photon:	in	seeking	to	come	“face-to-face”	with	it	as	that	which	integrates	subject	and	object,	we	hope	in	vain	to	turn	our	backs	on	the	subject-object	dichotomy,	to	negate	it.	By	contrast,	the	movement	backward	into	the	radiant	quantum	realm	does	not	simply	negate	the	classical	formula	but	brings	to	light	the	non-classical	ground	from	which	it	issues.		 The	backward	movement	of	awareness	required	for	the	perception	of	the	photon	may	be	understood	as	a	form	of	proprioception	(Rosen	2008a;	see	also	Rosen	2004,	where	the	relationship	among	proprioception,	Being,	and	light	is	explored	in	depth).	Etymologically,	to	perceive	is	to	“take	hold	of”	or	“take	through”	(from	the	Latin,	per,	through,	and	capere,	to	take),	and	to	conceive	is	to	“gather	or	take	in.”	These	activities	correspond	to	the	ordinary	from-to,	forward	gearing	of	ontical	consciousness.	The	term	“proprioceive”	is	from	the	Latin,	proprius,	meaning	“one’s	own.”	Literally	then,	proprioception	means	“taking	one’s	own,”	which	can	be	read	as	a	taking	of	self	or	“self-taking.”	The	term	finds	its	most	common	usage	in	physiology	where	it	signifies	an	organism’s	sensitivity	to	activity	in	its	own	muscles,	joints,	and	tendons.	But	Bohm	(1994)	spoke	of	the	need	for	“proprioceptive	thought”	(229),	which	he	viewed	as	a	certain	kind	of	meditative	act	wherein	“consciousness	...	[becomes]	aware	of	its	own	implicate	activity,	in	which	its	content	originates”	(232).	Years	earlier,	the	social	psychiatrist	Trigant	Burrow	spoke	similarly	of	the	need	for	human	beings	to	gain	a	proprioceptive	awareness	of	the	organismic	basis	of	their	divisive	symbolic	activity	(Galt	1995).	What	I	am	proposing	is	that	observing	the	photon	requires	that	the	observer	function	proprioceptively,	for	such	observation	would	not	merely	involve	observing	what	is	lit,	as	happens	under	the	classical	paradigm.	Instead	it	would	reverse	the	gears	of	perception	so	as	to	bring	awareness	of	the	ontological	lighting	process	per	se.	We	see	proprioceptive	observation	modeled	in	the	reflexive	self-penetration	that	takes	place	when	integrating	the	perspectives	of	the	Necker	cube.	To	be	brought	to	ontological	fruition	of	course,	the	microworld	self-penetration	of	the	Klein	bottle	would	be	necessary.		 Let	us	consider	Trigant	Burrow’s	approach	in	greater	detail	since	it	may	help	us	better	understand	what	is	needed	for	observing	the	photon.	We	have	found	that,	in	the	paradigm	of	object-in-space-before-subject,	the	subject	plays	the	role	of	an	idealized	cogito	standing	apart	from	the	world	and	acting	upon	it	with	impunity.	Burrow’s	term	for	this	Cartesian	subject	engaged	in	ceaseless	acts	of	objectification	is	“I”-persona.	For	Burrow,	the	functioning	of	the	“I”-persona	has	a	distinct	ana-tomical	locus.	It	is	centered	in	what	he	called	the	“cerebro-ocular”	region	(1953,	526),	that	is,	in	the	cerebral	cortex	of	the	brain	and	in	the	organ	of	vision	associated	
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with	it.	Burrow	pointed	out	that	it	was	through	the	phylogenetic	development	of	the	cerebral	cortex	that	the	perceptual,	linguistic,	and	symbolic	operations	of	the	“I”-persona	first	arose.	Therefore,	to	gain	a	proprioceptive	sense	of	this	objectifying	activity,	it	seems	one	would	need	to	bring	one’s	attention	to	the	cerebrum.	But	this	conclusion	was	informed	by	more	than	a	simple	logical	deduction.	Burrow	claimed	to	have	had	a	spontaneous	experience	of	the	“I”-persona’s	bodily	base,	one	that	profoundly	influenced	all	his	subsequent	research.	After	a	prolonged	period	of	inter-personal	strife	involving	the	members	of	the	group	that	he	had	established	to	investigate	such	“I”-based	conflict,	he	began	to	notice	a	distinctive	pattern	of	tension	around	his	eyes	and	forehead.	Burrow	recognized	in	this	the	bodily	expression	of	the	“I”-persona.		 Burrow	would	caution	us	not	to	confuse	the	“I”-persona	with	the	ego	of	the	allegedly	isolated	individual.	We	might	say	that	this	persona	is	the	species-wide	“subject”	that	lies	behind	the	appearance	of	individual	subjectivity.	But	while	it	is	through	the	“I”-persona	that	we,	as	a	species,	create	the	impression	of	ourselves	as	merely	isolated,	disembodied	subjects,	the	generic	“I”	itself	is	no	disembodied	subject.	It	is	the	bodily	process	that	is	central	to	human	functioning	as	a	whole.	Therefore,	when	Burrow	became	proprioceptively	attentive	to	the	“I”-persona	rather	than	continuing	to	be	unwittingly	governed	by	it,	he	experienced	this	palpable	pattern	of	tension	around	the	eyes	and	forehead	against	a	background	consisting	of	the	“tensional	pattern	of	the	organism	as	a	whole”	(Galt,	1995,	31).	He	was	thus	presumably	able	to	apprehend	what	he	called	the	“solidarity	of	the	species”	(Burrow	1953,	71)	or	the	“phyloörganism”	(445),	i.e.,	the	organism	of	humanity	at	large.	Burrow’s	research	associate,	Hans	Syz,	in	summarizing	this	attunement	to	the	phyloörganismic	background,	spoke	similarly	of	entering	into	“basic	physiological	harmony	and	feeling-continuity	with	the	mother-organism	and	with	the	world”	(1961,	285).	While	Burrow	was	not	a	philosopher	and	did	not	spell	out	the	ontological	implications	of	this	collective	organicity,	Syz	implicitly	related	the	phyloörganism	to	the	phenomenological	work	of	Erwin	Strauss,	and	to	the	Heideggerian	concept	of	being-in-the-world	(288;	for	a	discussion	of	this	onto-phenomenological	idea,	see	also	section	2.3	of	the	present	paper).	I	believe	we	may	plausibly	link	the	notion	of	the	phyloörganism	to	the	depth-dimensional	lifeworld	of	which	Merleau-Ponty	spoke,	where	the	subject	is	recognized	as	but	“one	of	the	visibles”(1968,	135).	Or	we	may	correlate	the	generic	human	organism	with	the	“living	web	within	which	all	relations	emerge”	(Bigwood	1993,	3)	that	Heidegger	called	Being.	And	this	is	the	radiant	quantum-ontological	microworld	that	constitutes	the	dynamic	substrate	from	which	the	ontical	world	of	object-in-space-before-subject	arises.		 Following	his	first	spontaneous	glimmer	of	the	phyloörganism,	Burrow	sought	to	cultivate	the	experience	in	a	systematic	practice	he	named	“cotention”	(1932).	He	described	his	procedure	as	one	of	setting	aside	daily	experimental	periods	in	which	he	“adhered	consistently	to	relaxing	the	eyes	and	to	getting	the	kinesthetic	‘feel’	of	the	tensions	in	and	about	the	eyes	and	in	the	cephalic	area	generally”	(1953,	95).	Elsewhere	(Rosen	1999),	I	proposed	a	further	specification	of	the	tensions	in	question.	
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	 Normal	binocular	vision	operates	in	such	a	way	that	our	eyes	function	in	concert	to	bring	a	particular	object	into	focus,	the	figure	standing	out	from	its	background.	An	example	of	this	is	our	strong	inclination	to	see	either	one	perspective	or	the	other	when	viewing	the	Necker	cube.	The	tendency	derives	from	the	well-established	neurophysiological	habit	of	binocular	convergence.	It	seems	to	follow	from	Burrow’s	analysis	that	binocular	convergence	is	a	process	of	visual	objectification	that	is	intimately	associated	with	the	symbolic	operations	of	the	cerebral	cortex.	Burrow	came	close	to	stating	this	explicitly	when	he	related	the	advent	of	objectifying	perceptual	activity	(what	he	called	“ditention,”	i.e.,	divided	attention)	to	the	elaboration	of	cortically	based	linguistic	operations,	and	related	language	to	the	movement	of	the	musculature	in	and	around	the	eyes.	The	ocular-facial	movements	described	by	Burrow	thus	can	be	said	to	entail	the	shifting	of	optical	focus	from	this	object	to	that,	in	continual	acts	of	binocular	convergence.	And	the	proprioception	of	binocular	convergence,	as	modeled	by	the	perspectival	integration	of	the	Necker	cube,	is	what	is	needed	in	the	observation	of	the	photon.	Burrow’s	initial	efforts	were	followed	by	a	program	of	research	in	which	physiological	measurements	were	made	of	subjects	practicing	cotention	while	engaged	in	activities	such	as	reading	and	viewing	pictures.	Burrow	and	his	colleagues	found	changes	in	respiration,	eye	movements,	and	brain	wave	activity	consistent	with	the	idea	that	participants	had	become	attuned	to	the	phyloörganismic	background	(1953,	chapter	XI	and	Appendix).	In	Burrow’s	research	however,	there	was	no	attempt	to	observe	the	phyloörganism	directly.	Participants	proprioceived	the	eye-brain	nexus	in	the	course	of	observing	ordinary	objects	in	a	macroscopic	setting.	The	ontological	quantum	realm	we	are	associating	with	generic	organicity	thus	came	into	play	only	as	an	obliquely	perceived	background	of	the	everyday	ontical	world.	By	contrast,	what	we	have	been	considering	in	the	present	investigation	is	the	prospect	of	observing	the	quantum	domain	in	an	immediate	way	via	the	proprioceptive	perception	of	the	photon.		 Earlier	I	noted	Bushell’s	(2016)	claim	that	it	is	possible	to	train	observers	to	perceive	single	photons.	In	this	paper	I	am	suggesting	that	such	micro-perception	would	necessarily	have	to	be	proprioceptive.	Here,	operating	reflexively,	the	observer	would	direct	her	awareness	to	the	eye-brain	nexus	as	her	optical	muscles	seek	to	fix	the	photon	via	binocular	convergence.	Whereas	in	ordinary	perception	the	observer	detaches	himself	from	what	he	observes,	with	proprioception	the	observer’s	interior	process	is	included,	as	is	required	for	entering	an	ontological	realm	not	amenable	to	the	splitting	of	observer	and	observed.	Attempts	to	observe	the	photon	“objectively”	would	only	collapse	the	radiant	quantum	wave,	destroying	its	coherence.	Of	course,	the	full-fledged	integration	of	observer	and	observed	also	depends	on	the	unique	nature	of	the	photon	itself.	We	have	seen	that,	for	its	part,	the	photon	“is	not	an	objective	thing	that	can	be	investigated	as	can	an	ordinary	object”;	light	“is	not	seen;	it	is	[the]	seeing”	(Young	1976,	11).	Or,	as	Sachs	put	it,	light	is	not	“a	thing	on	its	own”	(1999,	14),	not	an	independent	object;	instead	it	is	the	inseparable	blending	of	subject	and	object.	Therefore,	in	observing	the	photon	micro-proprioceptively,	when	the	observer	would	bring	her	attention	to	the	convergent	action	of	her	eyes,	the	photon	falling	on	her	retina	would	not	merely	register	as	an	objective	phenomenon	occurring	separately	from	her	subjective	
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viewing	process	but	would	connect	internally	with	that	process.	“Seeing”	the	photon	in	this	way,	she	would	be	seeing	herself—and	not	as	an	object	observed	by	a	more	abstract	self	(as	in	Husserlian	introspection),	but	as	“one	of	the	visibles.”	In	so	observing	the	photon,	she	would	become	the	photon.		5.		SUMMARY	AND	CONCLUSIONS		The	point	of	departure	for	this	article	is	recent	research	into	the	possibility	that	human	beings	can	perceive	single	photons.	To	better	appreciate	what	quantum	perception	may	entail,	I	explored	several	of	the	principal	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics.	I	then	offered	an	alternative	view	based	on	the	ontological	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	and	Martin	Heidegger.	The	philosophical	analysis	was	next	brought	into	sharper	focus	by	employing	a	perceptual	model:	the	Necker	cube,	augmented	by	the	topology	of	the	Klein	bottle.	After	examining	the	implications	of	all	this	for	addressing	the	key	question	of	observing	the	photon,	I	arrived	at	the	conclusion	that	the	observer	would	have	to	adopt	a	proprioceptive	observational	posture	that	would	bring	her	into	ontological	alignment	with	the	observed.		 Let	me	now	acknowledge	that	while	I	have	considered	at	length	what	would	be	required	in	principle	for	quantum	perception,	I	have	not	fully	dealt	with	the	precise	method	of	achieving	this.	For	a	more	specific	account	of	how	we	could	proceed,	we	would	need	to	understand	better	the	practical	requirements	for	viewing	the	world	on	a	microscopic	level.	We	do	know	from	Bushell	that	“adepts	or	virtuosi	of	special	meditational	techniques…	appear	to	be	potentially	capable	of	radically	enhancing	their	sensory	perceptual	capacities	to	the	point	of	…	directly	perceiving	light	at	the	scale	of	single	photons”	(see	previous	section).	However,	this	ability	has	yet	to	be	confirmed	and	studied	in	a	systematic	way,	and	its	relationship	to	proprioceptive	observation	would	have	to	be	clarified.	But	quantum	perception	is	a	promising	field	of	research	that	has	excited	much	interest.	Given	the	insight	into	quantum	reality	that	could	be	gained	if	the	difficulties	could	be	resolved,	I	expect	future	science	will	be	highly	motivated	to	continue	the	quest.		 Before	closing,	I	do	want	to	emphasize	my	conviction	that	the	science	of	quantum	perception	can	be	advanced	only	within	the	context	of	a	new,	non-objectivist	philosophy.	In	section	4.1,	I	focused	on	Fox-Keller's	“dynamic	objectivity”	as	exemplified	by	McClintock,	but	this	is	hardly	the	only	instance	of	the	burgeoning	of	a	science	informed	by	a	philosophical	approach	that	challenges	the	subject-object	split.	 The	phenomenological	initiative	that	began	early	in	the	twentieth	century	has	been	carried	forward	by	thinkers	like	Heelan	(1983)	and	Gendlin	(1991),	who	have	proposed	that	the	work	of	science	not	proceed	from	“stratospheric”	perception,	but	from	the	intricacies	of	the	lifeworld	or	lived	body.	A	non-objectivist	approach	to	science	also	is	advocated	by	biophysicist	Koichiro	Matsuno	(1995).	Matsuno	has	called	for	a	“dialogical”	science	that	would	supersede	the	old	“monologue”	carried	on	by	the	solitary	Cartesian	subject	looking	down	upon	the	world	from	above.	In	Matsuno's	vision,	scientific	activity	would	involve	a	community	of	subjects	concretely	engaged	with	each	other	in	dynamic	and	generative	
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negotiations.	Whereas	the	Cartesian	subject	is	anonymous,	absent	from	the	events	that	transpire,	the	participants	in	the	dialectical	community	would	function	self-referentially	to	include	themselves	in	the	process	(Matsuno	exemplifies	this	by	explicitly	including	himself	as	author	in	what	he	writes;	1995,	1998).	Other	important	contributions	come	from	Plamen	Simeonov	(2012),	who	has	emphasized	the	need	to	devise	first-person	methodologies	for	the	natural	sciences;	from	Arran	Gare	(2013),	with	his	insistence	that	science	be	grounded	in	a	way	that	includes	lived	subjectivity;	and	from	Louis	Kauffman’s	(2015)	reflections	on	how	mathematical	self-reference	is	related	to	topology	and	phenomenological	philosophy.	Still	another	contribution	to	emergent	dialectical	science	is	offered	by	the	philosopher	of	mathematics	Fernando	Zalamea.	In	his	“synthetic	philosophy,”	Zalamea	(2012)	applies	the	phenomenology	of	Merleau-Ponty	and	others	to	the	foundations	of	mathematics,	liberating	them	from	the	static	dualisms	that	constrain	conventional	thinking.	And	then	there	is	the	perspective	of	the	psychologist	and	philosopher	Nathan	Schwartz-Salant	(2007).	Operating	self-referentially,	he	employs	Merleau-Ponty	and	the	Klein	bottle	in	characterizing	the	deep	psychodynamics	of	human	relationships,	and	he	likens	the	fields	operative	in	these	paradoxical	interactions	to	field	processes	in	fundamental	physics	(see	also	Schwartz-Salant	2017).	Finally,	applications	of	Klein-bottle	philosophy	to	the	natural	sciences	have	been	proposed	by	physicist	Diego	Rapoport	(2011,	2013,	2018).	Efforts	such	as	these	have	facilitated	the	process	of	creating	the	philosophical	framework	that	will	be	necessary	for	an	effective	science	of	quantum	perception.		REFERENCES		Ananthaswamy,	Anil.	2018.	“The	Human	Eye	Could	Help	Test	Quantum	Mechanics.”	
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